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PREFACE
This study is a part of the larger collabora-
tional research work which three departments
of the University of Helsinki those of
Silviculture, Peatland Forestry, and Business
Economics of Forestry — have been earring
out since 1967. The roots of the study, how-
ever, lie further in the past. During the years
1961-64 I had an opportunity to work in
the Institute of Agricultural Policy, Univer-
sity of Hesinki, and to participate in an in-
vestigation where the economic consequences
of clearing forest land for cultivation were
evaluated. The results of the investigation
and especially the experiences I got in con-
versations with over two hundred small forest
owners on the study farms, made me con-
vinced that the problem of time factor had
not been solved quite satisfactorily in the
models used for comparison.
In the meanwhile many people have con-
tributed in helping me to clarify my hazy
thoughts and to put them out in the form of
this analysis. Two persons deserve to be
mentioned before any other. They are my
first teachers in the field of forest economics:
the late professor EINO SAARI and my father,
professor VALTER KELTIKANGAS. Their im-
pact on my pattern of thinking has been very
deep and lasting. Both of them perused the
manuscript in its earlier version and made
valuable comments.
During the many years professor PÄIVIÖ
RIIHINEN, my present principal, has provided
me with very favourable working conditions
in the Department of Social Economics of
Forestry. He also read the manuscript.
Some other persons did the same. Professor
BERTIL HÄLLSTEN of the Royal College of
Forestry, Stockholm, professor ERIK JOHN-
SEN of the Copenhagen School of Economics
and Business Administration, professors FEDI
VAIVIO and NILS WESTERMARCK and doctors
LEO AHONEN and KUSTAA SEPPÄLÄ all gave
their comments before the study was finally
completed.
The manuscript was translated into Eng-
lish by Mrs. HILKKA KONTIOPÄÄ, M.A. (Hel-
sinki), in cooperation with Mrs. BARBARA
RIKBERG.
Financially the work has been supported
by the FINNISH CULTURAL FOUNDATION, the
PAULO FOUNDATION, and the NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL FOR AGRICULTURE AND
FORESTRY. The SOCIETY OF FORESTRY IN
FINLAND accepted the study into its series of
publications.
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all
the persons and organizations mentioned
above, as well as to all others who have
helped me with their advice, encouragement
and inspiring opinions.
Helsinki, June 1971
Matti Keltikangas
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most prominent and most
discussed economic phenomena of recent
years has been the increasing tendency of
business enterprises to use quantitative
calculations as the basis of their decision
making. Scientific management, management
science, managerial economics, operations
research — these are a few of the names given
to the application of the optimization models
of mathematical-statistical methods and
economic theory to the solution of produc-
tional and marketing problems. Regardless of
the name, the method is rapidly gaining
ground, keeping pace with automatic data
processing, both in commerce and in industry.
At the same time, subjects dealing with these
applications can be seen to gain ground in the
science of business economics research.
This development is also beginning to
affect forestry and the research of forestry
economics. For the most part, forestry is
carried out in association with industrial
roundwood improvement or farming. The
situations of decision making are similar, in
their basic structure, to corresponding situ-
ations in any economic activity. Methods,
which from experience are known to be
efficient e.g. in the manufacturing plant and
the marketing department of a forest industry
company, are therefore not readily overlooked
when the same company is making decisions
concerning its logging operations or forest
administration. Accordingly, methods used
in the planning and supervision of agri-
culture and cattle husbandry on a farm hold-
ing are applied to the treatment of farm
forests.
Timber growing in forestry, however, has
characteristics distinguishing it from custom-
ary industrial production and farming. They
give it a special position as a kind of border-
line case among the forms of economy,
difficult to compare directly with anything
else (cf. V. KELTIKANGAS 1969, p. 133). Many
authors (e.g. SAARI 1928, pp. 12—13; GRON
1931, pp. 341—343; PETRINI 1946, p. 11;
VAUX 1953, pp. 17—18; WORRELL 1959, p.
430; STREYFFERT 1965, p. 47; SPEIDEL 1967,
pp. 31—32) list such special characteristics of
forestry and mention among the essential
points, the very long period of production
(Produktionsdauer, produktionstid) and the
arbitrariness of the borderline between the
production factor (growing tree) and product
(mature timber).
In the Finnish climate, the development of
a stand from seedling material to the first
cutting that yields marketable timber usu-
ally takes 25—50 years (KOIVISTO 1959), and
to the final cutting at the end of rotation,
50—150 years. As a result of this slow
rhythm of development, human measures
aimed at improving the growth of forest or
quality of timber cannot be expected to give
returns very soon. In most industrial pro-
cesses the interval from the installation of a
production plant or machinery or from the
purchase of raw materials to the marketing
of the first products runs in terms of days,
weeks or, at the most, a few months. Even in
agriculture the interval is usually less than
a year (cf. WORRELL 1959, p. 183; SAARI 1967,
p. 117; V. KELTIKANGAS I.e., p. 133). But in
forestry, even at its shortest, it is usually
5—10 years, and even then the majority of
the revenue-yielding effects may not be ex-
pected until several decades have passed (cf.
V. KELTIKANGAS I.e.). Compared with the
length of man's so-called productive or active
life span (from the 15th year of age onwards),
which seldom exceeds 50 years, the income
expectation periods in forestry can with
reason be considered over-long.
Nor is the time at which the product will
be completed so unambiguous and precise in
timber growing as in industrial serial pro-
duction or grain growing. A tree usually
continues to grow for several decades after it
has reached the minimum marketable size.
From this time onwards until the termination
of growth, the tree is biologically and techni-
cally fit for cutting at any moment. It is
simultaneously a »production factor» produc-
ing new wood material and a potential,
6finished »product». The timber grower — and
the prevailing institutions, such as forest
legislation — decide when, during this period,
the tree is considered mature and ready for
sale or consumption at home. The same
applies to a whole stand.
The arbitrariness in the timing of the
maturity of the product adds a speculative
feature to timber growing: this aspect can be
better compared with stock deals or specula-
tions — in the neutral sense of the word —
with changes in property value than with real
production and its combination of production
factors (cf. SAARI 1942, p. 8; V. KELTI-
KANGAS, I.C.).
The time factor is of such central and ex-
ceptional importance in timber growing that,
when methods of comparing alternatives and
calculation models developed for the control
of less time-centered activities are transferred
and applied to forestry, the greatest diffi-
culties can be expected a priori in the treat-
ment of just this time factor.
The traditional method has been to convert
all receipts and outlays (revenues and costs)
to be compared into their present values or
values of some other convenient date. The
conversion is made by discounting and/or by
compounding with compound interest and by
adhering to the simple mechanical exponential
transformation of x' = kAtx, where A t is
the time interval. The comparison of the
values so transformed has then been built
according to the so-called timeless or static
models of the general economic theory (cf. e.g.
PRESSLER 1859; ENDRES 1923; GODBERSEN
1926, pp. 55—60; HILEY 1930, pp. 131—164;
TANTTU 1942, pp. 171—199; S. PETRINI 1946,
pp. 22—23; DUERR 1960, p. 119; JORGENSEN
1964, a and b; EINOLA 1964; BENTLEY and
TEEGUARDEN 1965).
In principle, the method does not differ
from that routinely applied in investment
calculations (see e.g. HONKO 1963, pp. 80—
86). The special characteristics of forestry
are visible in the difficulty of choosing the
rate of interest percentage contained in the
transformer kA t = (1 -j—H_)At more than
in the actual methods of comparison. Or, if
the so-called internal rate of return method is
used (e.g. HONKO, I.e., p. 85), in the difficulty
of interpretation.
In timber growing the discounting period is
mostly very long, and therefore the rate of
interest, percentage p, becomes decisive.
Even relatively small differences in percent-
age — used in discounting over decades —
may lead to widely different present values
(e.g. SAARI 1942, p. 9; DUERR 1960, p. 111).
If, in addition, the time distributions of ex-
pected receipts and outlays are very different
under the alternative courses of action, the
selection of the interest percentage may suffice
to decide the issue. For this reason, the
»correct» interest percentage and the rules
facilitating its determination are perhaps
the essential problem in alternative forestry
calculations (BARLOWE 1958, p. 287; DUERR
1960, p. 143). This is indicated by the large
number of pages devoted to the subject in
textbooks and other literature (e.g. MARTIN
1918, pp. 135—147; ENDRES 1923, pp. 9—34;
HILEY 1930, pp. 90—104; GUTTENBERG 1950;
DICKSON 1956; AARESTRUP-FREDERIKSEN
1958; DUERR 1960, pp. 143—150; v. MALM-
BORG 1965; DAVIS 1966, pp. 324—335;
JOHNSTON et al. 1967, pp. 125—132).
Earlier literature usually started from the
assumption that there is a homogeneous »pure»
or »objective» rate of interest, or at least one
common to given categories of forest owners.
This could presumably be derived from the
»general» market rate of interest, with due
allowance for the differences caused by un-
certainty, liquidity, burden of management
and other similar factors (e.g. ENDRES 1923,
p. 33). Subsequently, the present stand of
general business economics gained ground,
viz. that the interest percentage is individual
and depends on the situation and case in-
volved. The authors now emphasize that the
interest percentage is an alternative cost and
should be selected so as to equal the highest
rate obtainable from other transactions with
identical resources (DUERR 1960, p. 44). Or
they place most weight on the interdepend-
ence between interest percentage and the
target set (HERMANSEN 1964, pp. 313—314).
This change in opinion, however, has
hardly helped to facilitate the selection of
this percentage or to make it more precise.
The insight that the interest percentage
reflects the effect of several different factors,
makes it understandable that the rates used
in calculations may differ widely. On the
other hand, the determination of the »correct»
percentage in each situation requires that
these effects should also be quantitatively
known. Many authors suggest, for example,
that compensation should be made for the
uncertainty inherent in the results of the
measures taken by adding a so-called risk
allowance to the »pure» rate of interest a
completely risk-free investment would yield.
Since the size of these components, however,
is left largely to subjective judgement (e.g.
WORRELL 1959, pp. 263—267; DUERR
1960, p. 148; STREYFFERT 1965, p. 248),
one problem has simply been replaced by two
new problems.
Certain analytical methods of more recent
date enable a slightly different approach to
the problem. The interest percentage — when
derived from empirical observations — is
a kind of residual factor: the effects of all
factors not explicitly considered in the model
are cumulated in it. If some of these factors
are separated to make new variables it may
be expected that the determination of interest
percentage is compressed into ever narrower
limits and at least its effect on the end result
of the comparison is weakened.
For example, in linear programming the
demand of the liquidity can be expressed as a
constraint on the optimization: the aim is to
maximize the present value of future net
revenues without the net revenue of any
year being below a pre-determined limit. As a
result, this aspect need not be included in
interest percentage (STRIDSBERG 1959; HER-
MANSEN 1964, p. 321; v. MALMBORG 1967, p.
57). Similarly, it has been suggested that the
risk allowance be replaced by a procedure
according to which the alternatives are
compared using a two-dimensional result
function: either the most probable result and
variance (DOWDLE 1962) or the minimum and
maximum values of the possible results
(MARTY 1964). The ideas of utilizing the
theory of games (F. PETRINI 1964, p. 92) and
sensitivity testing (MARTY 1964, pp. 13—14)
have the same purpose.
Although the selection of interest percent-
age cannot be decided by these methods as
such, they do facilitate it in a way, primarily
by reducing the number of factors that need
be considered in the selection. The interest
percentage itself still remains a problem. The
American author FLORA (1966), examined the
discount percentage.
Discussing the selection of interest percent-
age, many of the authors mentioned above
(e.g. GUTTENBERG 1950; DAVIS 1954, pp.
296—297; DUERR et al. 1956, p. 4; JORGENSEN
1964 a, p. 390) point out that the alternative,
rate of return may be determined either by
alternative investment opportunities or the
forest owner's subjective time-preference.
Time-preference rate is a concept dating
back — directly or indirectly — to FISHER'S
(1906, 1930) already classical theory explain-
ing interest formation. Roughly speaking, it
refers to the relative value of the present
(marginal) income ( = consumption opportu-
nity) compared with a (marginal) income
( = consumption opportunity) of equal
amount obtainable in the future (e.g. FISHER
1930, p. 61; GUTTENBERG 1950, p. 3).
FLORA, in his investigation mentioned
above, tried to discover whether, and under
what conditions, forest owners discount at
rates of time-preference. The answer to the
first question was in the affirmative: time-
preference did to some extent affect the
attitude to long-term investment of nearly
40 per cent of the New England forest owners
he questioned (I.e., p. 53). The most important
result of his theoretical and empirical study is,
however, in this connection the observation
(FLORA I.e., p. 41) that discounting of expect-
ed future revenues cannot in all cases be ex-
pressed in terms of an exponential function.
In other words, when time-preferences are
expressed in terms of compound interest the
interest percentage is not always fixed but
may vary depending on the length of dis-
counting period. Although FLORA'S study was
based on a small number of forest owners and
cannot, unmodified, be generalized to cover
e.g. the Finnish forest owners, his result
supports the corresponding view earlier
advanced e.g. by BARLOWE (1958, p. 288).
The traditional method of comparison,
therefore, should be corrected or complement-
ed so as to allow for the possibility of a
change in the rate of interest. According to
FLORA (1966, p. 51), present value transforma-
tion is in fact unnecessary; the comparison
may be carried out using so-called discount
loci. These are successions of points formed
by plotting, in a system of coordinates, the
revenues that the forest owner finds equal
in value, and that are expected at successive
points of time; they might be called indiffer-
ence curves. The alternative obtaining the
.s
highest discount locus would be the best.
This procedure, however, has some inherent
weaknesses, of which the worst is perhaps the
difficulty of determining the discount loci
empirically (FLORA I.e., p. 52) The model is
also deterministic, in other words, it does
not allow for the effects of uncertainty. More-
over, it is only suited for the comparison of
individual revenue items but not of series of
revenues (FLOKA I.e., p. 52).
As pointed out above, a characteristic of
timber growing actions is that the majority
of their effects are timed far in the future.
From the point of view of comparative
calculations, this makes the time horizon of the
calculations essential (e.g. SHACKLE 1961 a,
p. 223), in other words, how distant events,
on the whole, are relevant in the comparison.
In traditional forest economics this problem
has been solved very simply: the caclulations
are made to include, in one form or another,
all expected consequential effects of the
actions until infinity (e.g. ENDRES 1923, p.
57; GRON 1938, p. 345; BENTLEY and TEE-
GUARDEN 1965, pp. 82 and 86; STREYFFERT
1965, p. 284; cf. ENDRES I.e., p. 74; SAARI
1942, p. 7). Even the authors who have
doubted whether such a long calculation
period is meaningful have usually found it
necessary to extend the calculations to the
first final cutting following forest improve-
ment (DUERR 1960, pp. 241 and 243; WARD
et al. 1966, p. 28).
Usually the arguments for the procedure
have underlined either that the major
revenue resulting from forest improvement
is not obtained until the final cutting (DUERR
I.e., p. 243), or that the forest owner could if
he wished »realize» the unobtained distant
income by selling the whole stand before it
reached maturity. If the sales price is assumed
to equal the sum of the present values of the
net revenue that would later be obtainable
from the stand, and if the rate of interest
used in discounting is the same as that used
in the comparative calculations, the end
result is the same in both cases (e.g. HEIKIN-
HEIMO et al. 1967, p. 44; cf. WORRELL 1959,
p. 411). The inclusion of later rotations has
been recommended on the basis of »practical»
points of view such as the mathematical
simplicity of the formulas, and the fact that,
discounted over a very long period of time,
the incomes of the later rotations do not
much change the present value of a silvi-
cultural action and therefore usually do not
essentially affect the end result of the compa-
rison (e.g. ENDRES 1923, p. 74; GRON 1931, p.
459; TANTTU 1942, p. 199).
A calculation period limited to the first
rotation, however, would seem to exceed
greatly the length of the calculation periods
the forest owners actually apply. Not many
empirical studies have been made, but on the
basis of less precise observations and ex-
periences the »short span» of the estimates
by forest owners, and the contradiction be-
tween this and the time horizon used in the
calculations, have been underlined in several
contexts (e.g. Betänkande . . . 1899, p. 87;
LAITAKARI 1923, p. 6; JÄNNES 1939, p. 15;
HELANDER 1939, p. 126; WORRELL 1959,
pp. 344 and 411; SAARI 1967, p. 122). Not
until FLORA (1966) published his study were
any real measurement results concerning the
variation of the distances of time horizon
reported.
According to FLORA (I.e., pp. 46 and 48),
nearly one-third (15) of the 50 forest owners
studied in the region of New England had a
planning horizon at a distance of less than
10 years. Three of these 15 reported that the
distance was less than 5 years and one that it
was less than 2 years. For 35 the time horizon
was a minimum of 10 years distant FLORA.
did not extend his measurements any further.
These figures would seem to suggest that the
time horizons of forest owners hardly differed
so radically from those of farmers and other
entrepreneurs (e.g. HEADY 1952, p. 475;
KLEIN 1952, p. 65; SHACKLE 1958, p. 83 and
1961 b, p. 247; cf. also HONKO 1963, pp.
134—135) as the traditional theory foresaw.
The closeness of the time horizon is attri-
buted, at least partly, to uncertainty and
ignorance concerning future events (e.g.
SHACKLE 1961 a, pp. 223—224; 1965 pp. 81,
88—89). Increased knowledge and the stabi-
lization of conditions may therefore be ex-
pected to move the time horizon further
away (KOYCK 1965; WORRELL 1959, p. 411),
i.e. to prolong the time perspective (KATONA
1951, p. 52). The possibility of this gradual
development does not, however, alter the
fact that today, at least with certain forest
owners, the time horizon is demonstrably
much closer than 80—100 years. Some authors
believe that this applies to the vast majority
of forest owners (e.g. JÄNNES 1939, p. 15).
An investment calculation comprising a total
rotation of normal length necessarily, in these
cases, contains receipts and outlays which the
investing forest owner considers irrelevant
and does not value at all. This being so, it is
justifiable to ask whether an investment
calculation spanning the whole rotation
period, or its result, is fully relevant for the
forest owner.
According to FLORA, WORRELL'S answer to
this question is in the negative. WORRELL
suggests that if the forest owner's time horizon
is e.g. 30 years distant the calculations should
include only the receipts and outlays of this
time interval (FLORA 1966, p. 25; cf. BARLOWE
1958, p. 305). The proposed procedure, how-
ever, has not been universally accepted yet.
A time horizon extending to infinity is appar-
ently a deep-rooted concept in the theory of
forest economics (v.MALMBORG 1967, p. 26).
The methods used in forest economics for
applying the investment theory to the prob-
lems of forestry, and especially timber grow-
ing, would therefore seem to require checking
as regards the time factor. No universally
acceptable solution has been found for the
determination of the rate of interest. On the
other hand, the universal applicability of two
fundamental assumptions of the traditional
procedure, viz. exponential transformation
and unrestricted time horizon, have been
called into question. It seems that at least
these two assumptions should be replaced by
others which would permit a wider scope,
before the model of comparative calculations
can be expected to be applicable, indisputably
to all situations occurring in forestry.
The need for this re-consideration of the
traditional calculation methods of timber
growing became apparent when extensive
studies into the profitability sequence of forest
improvements were started in 1967, financed
by the National Research Council for Agri-
culture and Forestry. This so-called »sopimus-
tutkimus» (contractual research), supervised
by Professors VALTER KELTIKANGAS, LEO
HEIKURAINEN and PAAVO YLI-VAKKURI
seeks to calculate, on the basis of empirical
materials, the profitability sequence of the
following measures: natural and artificial
regeneration, afforestation, forest drainage,
forest fertilization, and management of
seedling stands. Especial attention is paid to
finding a basis on which profitability can be
quickly and easily determined on different
sites and in various conditions.
These forest improvement measures, con-
sidered as investments, vary greatly in the
length of time before their expected future
revenues can be realized. The calculations
must compare investments with spans rang-
ing from 5 to 100 years. In order to find the
appropriate methods and solutions it was
therefore deemed necessary to study first the
theoretical grounds of comparison in relatively
great detail.
The purpose for which results are used also
affects the formulation of calculating models.
Let us take investment on forest drainage.
Comparative calculations and their results
are required e.g. by a forest owner when he
decides whether or not to make the invest-
ment, the State Board of Forestry when it
issues instructions on the limits of forest
improvement drainage, and by the Water
Rights Courts when they have to decide
whether joint drainage will produce more
gain than harm, or how the cost should be
divided between the participating farms. One
calculation does not provide the answer for
all these users. The calculation model must-
be formulated separately for each case, »tailor
made».
The studies of this »contractual research»
seek to obtain information both for forest
policy planners and forest owners. The
present study will deal only with the latter
category and the calculations meeting their
needs. The realtionship between the person
working out the calculation and the forest
owner creates the framework of situations in
which the calculations take place. This frame-
work must apparently be specified, before the
angle from which the problem is approached
can be precisely and meaningfully defined.
Specification of the decision making process
is the first step in the definition of the prob-
lem. It follows that the final precise defining
of the problem in the present study is
relatively laborious and will swell the paper
accordingly. Recent research, however, has so
emphatically assigned the theoretical dis-
cussion of decision making to the sphere of
general economics, (see e.g. SIMON 1959;
MCGUIRE 1964; JOHNSEN 1968) that its
application to forest economics seems to be a
worthwhile experiment (cf. AHONEN 1970).
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Research results reported by economists,
organization theoreticians, psychologists, so-
ciologists and system analysts in their respec-
tive fields are, apparently, opening up new,
and promising avenues of approach.
This specification of the decision making
process leads to the discussion, in Chapter 3,
of the investment calculation as an informa-
tion-transforming and condensing calcula-
tion. The essential theoretical problem will
be the way in which the above aspects
associated with the time factor adjust the
transformation and condensation in practice.
In trying to find the answer, particular
attention is devoted to the possible object-
ives of the forest owner — decision maker and
their variations.
It follows from the approach selected that
the study is of a strongly interscientific
nature. The theory of decision making,
system theory and psychology are the partic-
ular branches of knowledge that are dealt
with more extensively than is usual in forestry
investment studies. Recent literature on
economics shows a distinct and increasing
tendency to emphasize the personal character-
istics of the individual responsible for econom-
ic management: investment also indicates
human behaviour in the first place. The
lowering and removal of barriers between
sciences helps to enlarge their scope and
enrich research. The business economics of
forestry can hardly lag behind this progress.
The present study investigates the funda-
mental of the business economics of forestry.
Its main purpose is to create the necessary
background for improving the calculations of
profitability in timber growing. In several
aspects it may be considered a continuation
of the work started by EINO SAARI (1942),
ANTTI TANTTU (1942) and VALTER KELTI-
KANGAS (1960) with their creditable investiga-
tions into the profitability of forest drainage.
There are reasons to emphazize the two
words »fundamentals» and »background».
This volume is intented to be an introduction,
laying the theoretical foundations for a series
of other volumes all concerning with the
same problem: how to choose the right
method and the right targets for a forest
improvement. Therefore, in the following the
reader will not find anything else but a rather
general model with a relatively high level
of abstraction. All the details peculiar to
each type of forest improvement and all
material calculations are to be presented and
discussed in the later volumes, i.e. in their
proper connections.
2. STUDY OUTLINE AND FRAME OF REFERENCE
The problem to be investigated is how the
time factor, i.e. the temporal differences be-
tween the effects of various alternative measures
should be taken into consideration in forestry
investment calculations. The field must, how-
ever, be limited, in some way, to condense the
presentation.
The predominant form of forest ownership
in Finland is a forest holding owned by one
person or a married couple. On the other
hand, the forest improvements indicated in
the introduction are mainly concerned with
timber growing. This, from the point of view
of investment calculations, is a more prob-
lematic group of actions than timber harvest-
ing (cf. STREYFFERT 1965, p. 47). For these
reasons, the present study will only be con-
cerned with investment calculations of timber
growing in an economic unit which is owned
and managed by a single physical person and
of which forest holding is a component part.
Calculations for forests owned by corpora-
tions such as companies, cooperative societies,
local or central government will be dealt with
in a separate paper. The same is true of in-
vestment calculations for timber harvesting.
The approach to the problem will be
concept-analytical. The purpose is to establish
the mathematical-logical structure of the cal-
culations, and the variables to be included in cal-
culations, however, in no more detail than is
warranted by the available empirical know-
ledge. The values to be given to these vari-
ables in actual situations of calculation are
going to be studied in subsequent applied
research.
Forestry can hardly be separated from the
other economic activities in the units under
review. Side by side with the forest holding,
these units usually comprise an agricultural
farm (cf. Metsälötilasto 1962) with diverse
lines of production. Other means of livelihood
are also possible sidelines, such as a grocery
store, repair shop, digging machine, and a
small-scale sawmill. Many forest owners also
accept hired work. In all cases the decisions
concerning the use of forest are more or less
closely linked with the owner's other income-
earning and spending decisions.
Forestry investment is therefore weighed
not only as a spending problem within
forestry itself but often also in relation to
alternatives provided by the other sectors of
the economic unit, especially by the agri-
cultural farm, and the household. The annual
»business» on a medium-sized privately
owned forest holding in Finland is often
restricted to two or three income and ex-
penditure items,the mean annual net revenue
to 2 000—3 000 marks (cf. IHAMUOTILA 1968,
p. 68), and annual expenditure to roughly
10 per cent of the stumpage revenues (cf.
UUSITALO 1968). For this reason, the separa-
tion of timber growing to make an independ-
ent sector of the enterprise in most cases
appears artificial. It seems that the owner of
a farm forest holding does not usually sell
timber from his forest just because the stand
is mature for cutting, but because he needs
money to pay his taxes, to finance his con-
sumption and/or for necessary investments in
agriculture, forestry or other sectors. In addi-
tion, not all forest holdings yield income
every year, and for this reason forestry can
seldom be anything but a sideline to the
owner, to eke out the real means of obtaining
and spending his earnings (cf. V. KELTI-
KANGAS 1969, p. 124). This makes it necessary
to consider forestry on these holdings as a
sideline.
This being so, the comparisons of timber
growing and other alternatives of the same
person's activities should be theoretically
conformable. Theoretical conformity here
means that the structure of ideas, or model,
behind the comparison, often implicit, is
always the same and contains the same vari-
ables. Despite this, the explicit form of the
calculations may vary. A variable may in
some cases be of so little importance that it
can be excluded from the explicit calculation
without altering the result. In other cases,
again, operational aspects may make inten-
tional simplification of the model compulsory.
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Studies of the calculations of limber growing
investment therefore seek to consider them as a
special application of the general theory of
comparisons and not as a separate problem.
Thus the study is, in a way, divided into
two phases. The first phase, which forms the
quintessence of the present volume, consists
of outlining, for investment calculations of
an economic unit owned and controlled by one
physical person, a model or theory which is
sufficiently generalized to cover all investments
within such a unit, whether they are in forest-
ry, agriculture, trade or industry. In the
second phase the model will be applied to
practical forest investment problems. For
reasons best seen from the later chapters of
this paper, the applications in detail belong
to the separate empirical investigations men-
tioned in introduction. Hence, in this volume
only some cardinal problems of application
will be shortly discussed.
Although in outlining the theory its general
nature, that is to say. its independence of the
character of the investment objects, is empha-
sized, it should be borne in mind that a unit-
ing and at the same time resticting factor is
the economic unit. In the first place, one thinks
of a forest owner whose activities comprise
things other than timber growing, for ex-
ample farming and the motor transport of
timber, and who makes investment decisions
concerning all three sectors. In his decisions
on agriculture he is a farmer, in deciding to
buy a truck he is a transport contractor. Yet
he is one and the same person, no matter
which category he is considered to represent -
or he may be generally termed the decision
maker. The discussion does not seek to be
general in the sense that it should include
the investment calculations of other types
of economic units, say a business enterprise in
joint-stock company form.
What is said above is not enough to make
the frame of reference for the study. The
structure of the calculation is affected not
only by the object of calculation (invest-
ment) and its internal characteristics, but
also and especially by the purpose of the
calculation, and the situation in which the
object (investment) is reviewed. It is necess-
ary to individualize these too, since without
such an individualization any discussion of
the form of the calculation would have no
definite basis (VIRKKUNEN 1954, p. 55).
In the literature on business economics,
investment calculations are understood to be
auxiliaries to the making of an investment
decision. HONKO (1955, p. 23 and 1963, p. 79)
stressed that they serve in analysing the
profitability of the different investment
alternatives. VIRKKUNEN (1964, p. 60) defines
the purpose of investment calculation as the
means of finding the most profitable alterna-
tive, and this opinion can be considered
widely accepted.
The definition, if left like this, is hardly
exhaustive. It says nothing of the decision
making process which the investment calcu-
lation is meant to help. An idea must first be
formed of this process before the frame of
reference of the present study can be drafted.
Not until then can the study outline be
precisely and finally formulated.
To start with, the concepts »investment»
and »investment decision» must be defined.
21. Investment
Like many other terms frequently used in
economic discussions, investment has several
different meanings. Words of course are only
auxiliaries obtaining their content from the
purpose for which they are used. A word can
be connected to a given set of phenomena,
but the angle of review, and the context in
which it is used, determine the characteristics
of the set the word refers to.
Different sciences (and their sectors)
naturally view things from different angles.
It is understandable that the definitions used
are at least externally different even when
they may mean the same thing. In a study
utilizing findings from several sciences this
creates certain difficulties: the viewpoints of
related sciences must be adapted to form new
angles of review, and dissimilar definitions
must be reconciled. If the fullest advantage
is to be taken of the new viewpoint, a certain
change of approach seems to be unavoidable.
These statements are not confined to the
present concept alone but apply to later
contexts also.
Disregarding the lists of definitions given
in wellknown textbooks and reference books
on the various sectors of economics, routinely
used, let us start from the definition perhaps
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most frequently seen in Finnish economics.
According to this definition (HONKO 1963,
p. 13), investment implies an outlay from
which returns are obtained over a long period
of time and which is usually connected with
a number of smaller outlays to be sacrificed
later, in other words, it implies the invest-
ment process consisting of these outlays made
at different times, of their flows as it were. To
quote Honko, the word 'investment' is often
restricted to imply only the major once-for-
all outlay at the beginning of this process, and
the later current outlays are considered ac-
cessories automatically belonging to the first
major outlay.
Both definitions emphasize the outlay
character of investment: either an outlay or a
series of outlays (flow of outlays). Returns,
however, are just as essential a part of
investment. Unless the invested outlay yields
returns, it is usually not called an investment.
Viewed as a process, the investment may be
seen as an integrated series of outlays in as-
sociation with a series of receipts (SCHNEIDER
1944, pp. 9—11; cf. also HONKO 1955, p. 28;
SCHNEIDER 1962, p. 198; JORGENSEN 1964a,
p. 389). An outlay is usually understood as a
cash outlay and a receipt as a cash receipt
(SCHNEIDER 1944, p. 11; HONKO 1963, p. 14),
that is to say, monetary payments made and
received by the economic unit (JORGENSEN
1969, p. 39).
As it stands, the definition is broad. On its
basis, many interconnected series of outlays
and receipts timed over a long period might
be termed investments although they cus-
tomarily are given other names, for example
disinvestment (sale of property) or borrowing.
If therefore the set of phenomena is not to be
expanded beyond the customary limits, in-
creased precision is required.
SCHNEIDER (I.e., pp. 15—16) suggests a
procedure by which the cases are divided into
two groups according to whether chrono-
logically the principal outlays or receipts are
closer. The group in which the weight of out-
lays - - regardless of the positive rate of
interest used for weighting — is closer than
that of receipts, represents the investment of
Type I, investment proper (egentliga). It
follows that those in which the weight of
receipts is always earlier than that of out-
lays, belong to Type II and are not invest-
ments proper (uegentliga). JORGENSEN (I.e.,
p. 40) called the latter type »negative invest-
ments» or »financing projects».
HALLSTEN (1966, pp. 18—19) proposed
that all the cases in which the first payment
item is an outlay be called investments. All
others would then be financing projects.
From the point of view of the present
study, it makes no difference which of the
two definitions is selected. In actual fact even
the difference between investments proper
and financing projects (»negative invest-
ments») also depends on the approach. Every
investment is necessarily linked up with
financing, and what the investing party
considers financing (e.g. taking a loan or
selling a forest lot) is an investment for the
other party (money lender or buyer of the
forest lot). A distinction is justified primarily
to make sure that the definition of invest-
ment should not unduly differ from that
usually accepted by the Finnish reader.
From now on, when investment is men-
tioned it refers in the first place to the kind of
an integrated series of outlays and receipts in
which the chronologically first member is an
outlay. The aspects that will be advanced
concerning investment calculations can be
generalized, without modification, to apply
also to calculations used in comparing the
other processes mentioned above.
A few remarks should perhaps be added to
the foregoing. Firstly, investment foresees a
time dimension (cf. 'long period' in HONKO'S
definition). This premise is here given the
interpretation that the receipt and outlay
items must be timed on a minimum of two
periods of time.
Secondly, the receipts and outlays of an
investment are always changes in total
revenue and expenditure of an economic unit.
The investment process can thus be reviewed
also from this broader angle: when deciding
on an investment, the forest owner in fact
exchanges the expected series of receipts and
outlays of his economic unit against another
expected series. The difference between these
series, the net changes, makes up the above
outlay and receipt series of the investment.
This broader angle is justified e.g. because
investment in this way is more clearly at-
tached to the entity of the economic unit
within which it will be reviewed. The con-
cept of investment undergoes no change
thereby.
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22. Investment decision
Investment decision can be made con-
ceptually precise on the basis of the above
definition of investment. In the present
study, investment decision is understood to
mean the forest owner's deliberate decision to
undertake (or not to undertake) a given invest-
ment process, in other words, to assume (or
not to assume) responsibility for the series of
outlays and receipts which, according to the
above, form an investment. The same thing
can also be termed to mean the conscious
resolution either to adhere to the expected
series of (total) revenue and expenditure for the
economic unit or to exchange it, by means of
investment, against another expected series of
revenue and expenditure.
It is necessary to emphasize the words
deliberate and conscious. An individual
(forest owner, decision maker) may also
exchange his series of revenue and expendi-
ture, i.e. modify his behaviour, without any
preceding deliberation. In other contexts,
therefore, any such change in behaviour
might justifiedly have been termed a decision
(e.g. SIMON 1957, pp. 4—5).
According to KATONA (1951, pp. 31—36)
an individual's behaviour is a response to a
stimulus. Receiving a stimulus, the individual
usually responds in the habitual way: he acts
as he has done before in a similar situation,
responding to a similar stimulus. Although
such routine behaviour and routine decision
can be more or less unconscious and mechani-
cal, it may follow a response pattern adopted
previously, even a complex one.
Sometimes, however, the individual faces
a situation for which he has no pre-existing
routine behaviour, or for which the existing
routine is no longer satisfactory. Once he has
recognized the situation, the individual finds
a solution and adopts a new response pattern.
This is called problem-solving behaviour by
KATONA, who considers its result a genuine
decision. There must, however, be tensions
which are associated with strong motivations,
if the genuine decision is to be brought to
birth. It is therefore a relatively uncommon
event (cf. KATONA I.e., pp. 47 50, 1953,
pp. 309—311).
KATONA emphasizes, however, that there
is no clear-cut division between routine and
genuine decisions, and that there are inter-
mediate forms. A similar approximate clas-
sification has also been used by other authors
who have studied decision making (e.g.,
SIMON 1957, pp. 91—92; MARCH and SIMON
1958, pp. 139 140; ALBERS 1961, pp. 220 —
221; DUERR et al. 1968, p. 761; TÖRNQVIST
and NORDBERG 1968, p. 761). SIMON (1960,
pp. 5 -7 ) distinguishes between programmed
and nonprogrammed decisions among those
made consciously. The latter probably cor-
respond very closely to KATONA'S genuine
decisions. GORE (1964, pp. 136—142) speaks
of innovative decisions and divides the
programmed decisions into routine and adap-
tive (cf. LAUKKANEN 1968, p. 35). TÖRNQVIST
(1963) gives a list of six types of decisions,
composed of the above two main types and
intermediate forms.
If the concepts described above are used,
the investment decision of the present study is
very close to a genuine decision. The pure
routine decision can be excluded from dis-
cussion, for the use of the investment calcu-
lation studied is an indication that the forest
owner is making a deliberate decision. In this
form the definition of an investment decision
probably corresponds more closely to the
meaning given to the term in customary
economic usage (e.g., JOHNSON et al. 1961,
p. 105; SHACKLE 1961a, p. 13; F. PETRINI
1964, pp. 72 73, 230; cf. however RENBORG
1962, p. 20).
The investment decision, when understood
as described above, is the end result of the
decision making process. This process con-
nects the changed conditions acting as incen-
tive, the stimulus, with the final choice made
between possible alternative responses, the
decision. The detailed course of the process,
however, has been described slightly differ-
ently by various authors.
Most authors seem to agree that the
decision maker, having received the stimulus
and recognized the problem, first specifies the
problem to be solved, then searches and generates
the possible alternative solutions, and finally
compares the alternatives choosing the one he
finds best for his particular circumstances (cf.
e.g. MARCH and SIMON 1958, pp. 179—180;
VIRKKUNEN 1961, p. 606; RAMSTRÖM 1963,
p. 43; GOULD 1968, p. 794; LAUKKANEN 1968,
p. 32). This can be expressed also by the
general problem solving pattern quoted from
JOHN DEWEY: the decision maker must find
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answers to the questions »what is the prob-
lem? what are the alternatives? which alterna-
tive is best?» (DEWEY 1910, p. 72). SIMON
(1960, p. 2) uses descriptive terms to indicate
these three phases: »intelligence activity»,
»design activity» and »choice activity». LAUK-
KANEN (1968, p. 32) used the terms »start»,
»search» and »choice».
This variety of viewpoint arises mainly
from the authors' different assumptions
concerning the correlations and interdepend-
ence of the decision making phases. The
phases may be viewed as a chain of successive
actions in which the effects between com-
ponents have one trend: the precise defining
of the problem is followed first by a search
for alternatives, then comes the comparison
of alternatives, and finally the choice or
decision is made. On the other hand, the
phases may be understood as more or less
parallel or simultaneous progressive actions,
even with reciprocal correlations (cf. AHONEN
1970, p. 26). For example, progress in the
search for alternatives and the results obtai.
ned have a »feedback» effect on the formula
tion of the problem, and the comparison
of alternatives similarly affects their search.
The majority of authors start from the
former basis. Traditional economic thinking
may have contributed to this; it usually
analyses individual behaviour as consisting of
choices concerned with an assumed change in
a circumstance or circumstances (cf. e.g.
FRIEDMAN 1962, pp. 6 —7; HEADY 1952, p. 3;
VAIVIO 1962, p. 16). But a tendency to
simplify the treatment of a complex occur-
rence may also be contributory. In any case,
the main problem in decision making is
apparently how to choose the best of the known
alternatives, the one which will be finally put
into practice (cf. RIISTÄMÄ 1966, p. 31).
This so-called choice thinking (LAUKKANEN
1968, p. 24; cf. also HIRSHLEIFER 1965, p.
516) especially characterizes the mathemati-
cal-statistical models of decision making.
Both the decision theory and the theory of
games are based on the assumption that the
problem and the alternative solutions are
known or »given» (see CHERNOFF and MOSES
1959, p. 10; FISHBURN 1964, p. 3; STOLLER
1964, p. 12; BAUMÖL 1965, p. 550; DAVIDSON
et al. 1957, p. 205). Although some authors
(e.g. CHURCHMAN et al. 1957, pp. 105—114;
FISHBURN 1964, p. 22) emphasize the im-
portance of defining the alternatives and the
problem to be studied, these procedural rules
or instructions, which in the first place are
meant to be normative, remain more or less
dissociated from the choice models. This ap-
plies not only to the operational analysis but
also to most lists of steps to be taken (e.g.
DRUCKER 1959, pp. 392—405; COOPER 1961;
NEWMAN 1963, pp. 105-117) in the so-called
planning techniques (cf. LAUKKANEN 1968,
p. 27).
The choice, and the search for alternatives,
are firmly interconnected in normal decision
making, for the final result of the choice is
essentially affected by the range of the alter-
natives from among which the choice is
made. Only in exceptional cases does the
decision maker obtain the alternatives »cut
and dried». He must usually look for them
and develop them himself. Since both pure
introspection and the results of psychological
research show that individuals have a rela-
tively limited capacity for making observa-
tions and treating the information (e.g.
JOHNSEN 1968, pp. 362—365), it is im-
probable that the decision maker will always
be able to find, or take up for deliberation, all
possible alternative solutions (cf. SIMON 1957,
p. 67). In order to be complete, the explana-
tion model of decision making must also have
the mechanism, or submodel, for illustrating
the search for alternatives (Cf. LEAVITT 1964,
p. 86; HONKO 1966, p. 86; RAMSTRÖM 1969,
p. 107).
If the search model is to be fitted into the
entity it must indicate; when the activity
starts and when it ends. The recognition of
the problem created by the impulse and its
(first) organization are the natural triggers
starting the search for solution alternatives,
but the end of the search process can be
described in several ways. Decision makers
may be assumed to search for solution
alternatives for a given period of time, after
which the search is terminated irrespective
of wether or not alternatives have been
found. The search may also aim at a given
number of alternatives regardless of the time
it takes. Both descriptions would concur well
with a model of the decision process consisting
of a chain of phases. The authors who have
explicitly defined the end of the search seem,
however, without exception to link this up
with the kind of alternative found.
16
Two explanations have been proffered.
According to one, the search is terminated
when the expected additional benefit from
continued search no longer corresponds to
the additional cost involved (SCHLEIFER
1965, Chapter 5; TÖRNQVIST and NORDBERG
1968, p. 15). The other explanation says that
the search is terminated when the first or the
first few satisfactory alternatives are found
(e.g. SIMON 1955, pp. 110—111; 1964, p. 8).
Both presuppose that the search and compa-
rison processes are partly parallel, or rather
that they form a loop (of activities): the alter-
native^) found is compared with other known
alternatives, or (in the latter case) with the
target defined in advance, after which the
search for alternative(s) is resumed as many
times as required in order that the condition
for the termination of search is met.
The expected additional benefit can pro-
bably be clearly defined only if a sufficiently
exact idea can be created in advance con-
cerning the alternatives that may be found.
Since this kind of pre-knowledge is hard to
accept as a generally realistic assumption (cf.
MARCH and SIMON 1958, p. 14; JOHNSEN
1968, p. 451), the latter of these explanations
seems to be gaining ground (see e.g. RIISTÄMÄ
1966, p. 33; JOHNSEN 1968, p. 565; RAM-
STRÖM 1969, pp. 110—111).
Similarly, it may be shown that the precise
definition of the problem, the search for
alternatives and their comparison, together
form a more or less distinct activity loop.
Especially when the individual is solving a
problem essentially different from those
experienced earlier, he often re-defines and
modifies his task as new information is
accrued during the search and the comparison
of alternatives. The final problem solved is
therefore not always the one for which an
answer was originally sought. Formulation of
the problem, in its turn, is considered to
affect the search and development of the
alternatives by determining the properties
requiring attention. (See e.g. SIMON 1964,
pp. 7—8; DORFMAN 1966, p. 60).
Not all authors confine the decision pro-
cess to these three component phases. The
decision is usually followed by putting it
into practice (»action phase», GOULD 1968).
Especially in larger firms, this involves con-
version of the decision into a detailed plan
of activity — development of procedural
rules or routines (programming) — and
supervision of its implementation (see e.g.
VIRKKUNEN 1961, pp. 607, 616; KILANDER
1962, p. 17; DUERR et al. 1968; HONKO 1969,
pp. 188—198). Both actions may be shown to
exert a certain influence on later decisions,
i.e. the start and course of new decision
processes.
Since the present study deals with an
individual decision and not decision activity
consisting of consecutive decision processes
(TÖRNQVIST and NORDBERG 1968) a detailed
analysis of the implementation process (I.e.) is
hardly necessary here (cf. also SIMON 1960,
p. 56). The same applies to acceptance of the
consequences of the decision. Its importance
is emphasized e.g. by JOHNSON et al. (1961),
classifying it as a separate phase (»acceptance
of responsibility», cf. also CASTLE and BECKER
1962, p. 8). However, the level-of-aspiration
mechanism and its role in originating the
investment decision are worth discussing in
this context.
The concept of a »satisfactory alternative»
contains the assumption that the decision
maker draws up targets for his activity
aiming at a fixed amount rather than an
optimum. He seeks to obtain something »at
least» or »at the most» instead of the largest or
smallest amount possible of the characteristic
involved (see JOHNSEN 1968, p. 472). The
assumption is supported by earlier inferences,
and also by the fact that it is mathematically
possible to maximize or minimize only one
dependent variable at a time (e.g. CHAMBER-
LEIN 1955, pp. 67—68; HERMANSEN 1964,
p. 312). When studies of individual persons'
goals suggest very clearly a variety of goals
which at the same time are not commensur-
able (see especially JOHNSEN 1968; cf. also
MCGUIRE, 1964, pp. 74, 248—249), optimiza-
tion would seem operational only excep-
tionally. Optimization apparently has no
alternatives other than fixed targets or pure
randomness, i.e. lack of goal.
The »fixed-ness» of the targets is usually
understood as momentary or periodic (e.g.
CHAMBERLEIN 1955, pp. 40—44; CLARKSON
1963, p. 57). Both KATONA (1952, pp. 91—98;
1960, p. 130) and SIMON (1959, pp. 263—264)
connect the setting of targets with the so-
called level-of-aspiration mechanism, a concept
they have borrowed from psychology. Ac-
cording to this, individuals (and corporations)
17
define for themselves aspiration levels which
they must be able to exceed (or pass below, if
the level is of the maximum type) in their
activity. The level of aspirations depends on
the individual's own earlier achievements
but also on those identical social group
members and reference groups with whom he
compares himself (MARCH and SIMON 1958,
p. 184). If an alternative to fulfil or meet the
aspirations can be found relatively easily and
soon, the decision maker usually raises the
aspiration levels of his activity. The result is
the same if he finds that a reference person or
group has managed better than he expected
(KATONA 1951, p. 92). But if no satisfactory
solution seems to be found with reasonable
efforts the decision maker begins to lower his
aspirations, at the same time trying to find
new possible solutions. Alternatively, he may
experience frustration and his work gradually
loses its target (KATONA I.e., p. 93). (Con-
cerning this process, see also JOHNSEN 1968,
pp. 331—344, and COHEN and CYERT 1965,
p. 332).
When an individual's targets, therefore,
are observed at consecutive dates they are
variable, and decision making acquires
dynamic features. Modification of targets,
however, is not continuous but occurs in
phases as the results of activity are visible.
It is therefore relatively slow (MARCH and
SIMON I.e., p. 183). The standards an individ-
ual sets for the results of his work may there-
fore be termed »relatively» fixed (JOHNSEN
1968, p. 343).
The model of the search for alternatives,
based on fixed targets, foresees something
like this mechanism for the adjustment of
aspiration levels (cf. MARGOLIS 1958, p. 190).
If the individual's targets were assumed to be
completely static, it would be difficult to
explain why the search is terminated in
cases where no alternative decision to meet
the said aspirations is available. On the other
hand, a model which allows the so-called
personalistic variables to affect the search
process is probably more realistic than one in
which these variables only affect the com-
parison of decision variables.
The start, as well as the termination, of
the search for alternatives are explained by
means of the level-of-aspiration mechanism.
According to MARCH and SIMON (I.e., p. 184),
the gap between results achieved and the
level of aspirations forms a stimulus (LAUK-
KANEN 1968, p. 34). When the gap is wide
enough, in other words, the intensity of the
stimulus exceeds a given reaction threshold,
the individual receives and perceives the
stimulus and begins to define the problem
concealed in the situation. This starts the
process of searching for decision alternatives
(GORE 1964, pp. 49—62; LAUKKANEN I.e.,
pp. 42—43, 54). The search goes on until the
stimulus has been eliminated, i.e., the ex-
pected level of achievement is again in
agreement with the level of aspirations, or
the individual is frustrated (SIMON 1959,
p. 263).
Whether and to what extent this level-
of-aspiration mechanism agrees with the
individuals' true internal behaviour is diffi-
cult to verify. The situation contains a so-
called »black box», in other words, a pheno-
menon or »system» with a structure that
cannot be directly observed (see e.g. ASHBY
1956, pp. 86—93; OPTNER 1960, pp. 3—4).
Nothing much can be done beyond observing
the conditions, and the responses to these
conditions, that is to say, »the inputs and out-
puts of the system». On their basis, it is
possible to attempt conclusions as to contents
of the black box, in other words, the »inter-
vening mechanism» that converts the inputs
into outputs. Whether the resulting models
are realistic and which of them are better
than the others can only be indirectly esti-
mated, by analysing how well the behavioural
predictions they produce agree with reality
(cf. MILLER and STARR 1967, p. 16; ENGEL
et al. 1968, p. 21).
The level-of-aspiration mechanism, in its
details, leans on introspection but primarily
on the results obtained in psychological
studies of the individual's goal-striving
behaviour (see e.g. KATONA 1951, pp. 91—93;
JOHNSEN 1968, Chapter 7.6.). The model has
been indirectly tested in certain simulated
economic decision making (CYERT and MARCH
1963, pp. 84—99, 128—148), but on these
points the empirical evidence is still relatively
small and not binding.
For the present purpose, however, it is
enough that this construction of ideas has not
been proved erroneous and that it is the most
generally adopted among the explanations of
the »satisfactory alternative».
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23. Model of decision making
The picture thus outlined above of the
component phases of the decision making
process, and their interconnections, gives an
indication of the principal trend of »Simonian»
thinking recently adopted to an increasing
extent in business economics and theory of
organization. According to it, the decision
maker facing a problem usually
1. must personally search for or develop the
decision alternatives, instead of being
presented with ready-made alternatives,
2. takes a relatively small number at a time
for consideration, since he cannot simul-
taneously perceive and compare very
many alternatives (see e.g. SIMON 1955,
pp. 99—101; SHEPARD 1964, pp. 263—266;
IJIRI 1967, p. 156; JOHNSEN 1968, Chapter
7.8.),
3. accepts as his decision the alternative that
meets the minimum aspirations for the
measure, without really seeking the maxi-
mum results, and
4. if he finds the solution »too» soon or not at
all, modifies his aspirations to balance the
situation, in other words, learns from the
results of his activity (JOHNSEN 1968,
p. 519).
It may be necessary to add some detail to
this general picture before the purpose and
aims of investment calculations are discussed.
There is no generally accepted model avail-
able for the purpose. Although the above
basic lines provide the framework for devel-
oping a model of the decision making process,
considerable variation is possible in details.
Examples that can be mentioned are the
models applied by JOHNSEN (1968, pp.
522—525) and RAMSTRÖM (1969, pp. 110—
111) in their studies, the former as the basis of
computer simulation to help decision making,
and the latter as a frame of reference in the
study of the »means-ends» hierarchy of
Swedish insurance companies. With both
authors, the purpose for which the model was
used has essentially affected the choice of the
details included. The same is true of the
structure ENGEL et al. (1968, p. 351) applied
in their theory explaining the consumer's
behaviour.
The model of decision making process to be
Problen recognition
Precise definition of the problem
Search for decision alternatives
Evaluation of alternatives found
Deciision J7I
1_ 1 Implementation of decision |
I J
Fig. 1. General course of decision making in a
genuine decision process.
presented below has been compiled by fitting
together, as far as possible, the materials
contained in the three models described, and
by taking into account other viewpoints,
some of which have already been touched
upon in the foregoing. The resulting model, in
the present writer's opinion, is at least partly
new and differs in many points e.g. from the
generalized decision making model AHONEN
(1970) uses as a background when he de-
scribes the process of forest price formation.
Fig. 1, in the form of a block diagram,
illustrates the three component phases of
decision making process: precise definition of
the problem, search for decision alternatives,
and evaluation of the alternatives found. It also
reveals that, for an activity to be started,
problem recognition is required, and the
decision is followed by the process of imple-
mentation. Arrows indicate the chronological
order of the phases, and the activity links or
loops contained in the process. The broken-
-line arrow uniting the process of implementa-
tion and problem recognition suggests the
possibility that the results may create a
new problem.
The more detailed structure can be seen
from Fig. 2, in which Block A specifies the
problem recognition. The individual receives
information both on the results of his own
actions and on the achievements of reference
individuals and groups. The acceptance of
this information is selective: only a fraction
External information
I
_(. vj Idea of one's own I
i achievements '
' Idea of other peo- *
1
 nls's achievements
of as
U
--T"n~J
f Problem j
V recognition /
olerances
Active search
for information
Adjusted idea of
.own achievements
Adjusted idea of
lathers' achievemJ
Adjusted levels
of aspirations
JL
Adjusted idea of differences •
requirements for the solution
of problem, i.e. foals
Division of goals into genera-
tors and tests f-
Development of alternatives by
means of generators
Formation of expectations about
consequences of alternatives
Testinp the acceptability of an
alternative by comparing expec-
tations and test poals
Dec is ion •
the alternative adopted
Implementation of the decision
- routines
- control E I
i
Fig. 2. Decision process model.
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of all potential information continuously
reaching the individual and perceivable to
him, is really absorbed. From the flow of
information, the individual filters primarily
those data which he is »tuned» to receive,
while the balance passes unperceived. In-
formation arrives in the form of various
signals which the receiver interprets, that is
to say, converts into information. On this
point, too, the individual's internal »tune»,
attitudes, etc., affect the kind of knowledge
ultimately perceived, (see ENGEL et al. 1968,
pp. 79—112; also SIMON 1959, pp. 272—273).
Information arriving at the destination
confirms or modifies the individual's ideas o f
his own condition and achievements, and of
those of the reference individuals and groups.
If information creates an essential change in
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either, the individual responds by modifying
his levels of aspiration. Modification of the
level of aspiration again makes him compare
the new level with the ideas he has of his own
achievements or level of achievement. If the
differences are wide enough, i.e. if they exceed
the individual's tolerance limits, he recognizes
the situation as a problem. (Gf. WRIGHT
1964, p. 156; ENGEL et al 1968, pp. 350 and
360—361).
Interpreted in this way, the process leading
to problem recognition is highly individual.
»Filtering» the information, interpreting sig-
nals, formation of the levels of aspiration,
and response level, i.e. tolerance limits, vary,
and therefore different individuals may be
expected to respond differently to the same
information supplied to them. Some, in a new
situation, recognize a problem sooner, others
more slowly.
After problem recognition the individual
initiates action in order to solve or eliminate
the problem, and this is called decision
process. The first thing is usually to define the
exact problem (Fig. 2, Block B). The above
recognition mechanism must be understood
to operate mainly on the lower, »passive»
levels of the individual's consciousness. When
the individual perceives that he is faced with
a problem this does not necessarily mean that
he recognizes exactly what is wrong. The
problem at this stage may be a more or less
vague »annoyance» which must be defined,
i.e. »identified». At the same time the in-
dividual must make sure that the problem is
genuine, and not only due to incomplete
information, or to information incorrectly
interpreted.
To this end, the decision maker first
strives to define his idea of the state of
affairs, mostly by the active collection of
additional information. Definition of ideas
results in adjustment of aspiration levels and,
later, an adjusted idea of whether the actual
state and action essentially differ from the
aspirations. If not, the situation is relieved,
whereas in the opposite event the process
continues.
The problem is now to eliminate the ob-
served gap: the decision maker strives to
find a means, either by modifying the
existing modes of activity or by adopting an
entirely new activity, to restore the balance
between achievements and aspirations (cf.
WRIGHT I.e., p. 156). This is the beginning of
the phase above termed as the search for
decision alternatives (Fig. 2, Block C).
By defining his precise idea of the differ-
ences between achievements and aspirations,
the individual outlines and recognizes the
requirements that must be met by the
solution sought. They are partly straight-
forward goals (for example, net receipts
obtainable by the action must cover the
deficit found in the total net revenues), partly
limitations of activity (acceptable action or
combination of actions must conform to law
and to what is socially expected of the de-
cision maker, it must not entail reductions in
the individual's other activities, it must be
capable of implementation by a given date,
etc.). The distinction between goals and
limitations is not really very sharp. The
former are usually considered to be more
flexible, the latter more or less unyielding.
But in many cases - e.g. role expectations —
the main difference is in emphasis. Both may
therefore justifiably be combined under the
same heading »goals» (SIMON 1964, p. 6;
DORFMAN 1966, p. 61; cf. JOHNSEN 1968,
p. 234 fn.).
When he starts searching for or developing
his alternatives, the decision maker chooses a
number of the goals to serve as generators
which guide the search and development of
the alternatives that will be studied. The
balance is used to test the acceptability of
the alternatives found. (Gf. SIMON 1964,
pp. 7—9; WRIGHT 1964, p. 65). The division
into generator and test goals is individual
(SIMON I.e., p. 9), but is probably largely
based on various »rules of thumb» or heuris-
tics. (See e.g. SIMON 1960, pp. 29 30;
CLARKSON 1963, pp. 349 -352).
The same applies to the search (genera-
tion). Among the heuristic methods used,
CYERT and MARCH (1964, p. 295) mention the
method of starting from the neighbourhood
of the cause of the problem and/or the acti-
vities conducted to date, and gradually
extending the search. The use of the »means-
ends» chain is also wellknown (SIMON 1957,
pp. 62 66, 99—100; 1960, p. 27; RAM-
STRÖM 1969, p. 116). Unless there seems to be
a feasible alternative among the generators
selected, the individual may adjust the
division or the aspiration levels of the de-
cision.
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After the decision maker has found or
generated one or more alternatives to meet
the requirements used as generators, he
begins to evaluate their acceptability in the
light of test goals (Fig. 2 Block D). To this
end, he first formulates for himself the
expectations concerning the results from each
alternative and then compares these result
expectations with test goals (levels of
aspirations).
If the tested alternative meets all require-
ments made of the solution and was not found
»too easily», it becomes the final solution or
the decision. When several simultaneous
alternatives are available for study, and all
prove to be acceptable, the individual
chooses the best one. If the solution was
found without trouble the individual may
adjust (»step up») his levels of aspirations and
continue the search. Also if none of the
tested alternatives meets his requirements he
returns to continue the search and the
generation of new alternatives. Delayed solu-
tion, however, may make him adjust his
goals and their division into generators and
tests. In most of these cases, the decision
maker now alters his search heuristics or
expands his search. For example, having
started to search for the solution in the
sphere of the existing activities, he may
gradually take into consideration entirely
new forms of activity (MARCH and SIMON
1958, pp. 179 180; KATZ and KAHN 1966,
p. 279). If so, the problem itself may be said
to undergo a modification.
Once the decision has been made, activity
continues in the form of an implementation
process (Fig. 2, Block E). Its details need not
be specified in this context.
The model described is intended to show
the course of a genuine decision process in its
complete form. When individuals adopt
standard procedures, various modifications,
mostly reductions, will arise. The heuristics
referred to above indicate them. In perfectly
routine decision making (in making a routine
decision) the course is shortened: stimulus
received from internal or external informa-
tion is identified, and the solution is auto-
matically found from memory where it has
been »programmed» as a result of earlier
decision processes (cf. ENGEL et al. 1968,
pp. 352—354; BASS 1965, p. 378; GOULD
1968).
24. Investment calculation
Using the above model of decision process
as the frame of reference, the reasons for
drawing up investment calculations and
their aims can now be analysed in greater
detail. When investment calculation is con-
sidered to be part of the investment decision
it must be possible to derive its function
from the latter. The calculation must be
adapted to the model of decision making.
The first thing is to see whose calculation is
analysed. The following alternatives are
possible:
decision maker, in this case the forest
owner himself,
— adviser helping him, i.e. a consultant,
an interested outsider who takes no direct
part in decision making.
The interested outsider is usually interested
in the decision maker's practical steps. His
objective is either to foresee the decision
maker's (forest owner's) decisions and the
subsequent actions, or to find such factors
affecting the decision making (parameters) as
might be controllable.
By way of an example, there may be an
authority commissioned with planning such
measures as would promote afforestation of
arable land. This person is interested to know
the factors or the changes in factors which
have an influence on the farmer's afforesta-
tion decisions, either positive, negative or
neutral. He may try to discover the possible
or probable effects of afforestation rewards,
free-of-charge seedlings, exemption from tax,
etc., by calculations which simulate the true
decision making by the farmers/forest owners
under review.
In order to foresee the results and to find
control parameters, it is essential to know the
process of the decision maker's solutions,
phase by phase, and how they originated.
What kind of decisions ought to be made
from the point of view of the forest owner
himself or the interested outsider is a
secondary question.
The forest owner and the consultant, on
the other hand, participate actively in the
decision making process and see the problems
accordingly, but not identically. The forest
owner is interested to know how he should
proceed, in other words, which, from his
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point of view, would be the »correct» proce-
dures and »correct» solutions in the different
phases of decision making. His investment
calculations are intended to provide either a
direct solution or information on which to
base the solution.
The adviser or consultant in his turn tries
to help the forest owner make the decision.
He has been hired for this purpose. Invest-
ment calculation is for him the tool he uses to
do the task he has been given and has ac-
cepted. The detailed aim of the calculation is
determined by the specification of the task
delegated to the consultant in each particular
case.
The present study will review the invest-
ment calculation as one made by the consul-
tant. The question it will try to answer is:
what kind of structure and content must such
a calculation have in order to meet the ex-
pectations.
The selection of this angle of review is
justified for the following reasons:
1. Few Finnish forest owners are capable of
working out investment calculations con-
cerning timber growing. Where the forest
owner bases his decision on calculations
they have usually been made by a hired
consultant or other expert. The same is
largely true of the forest owner/decision
maker as a farmer, although those capable
of independent calculations are apparently
much more numerous among the farmers.
2. The aim will be to develop the theory to
meet the needs of the »contractual research»
mentioned earlier. When the research
worker tries to calculate guiding figures
which could help the forest owners to
decide the issue, he is working in much
the same way as a consultant. Neither of
them makes the calculation for his own
personal ends or with a view to leading the
forest owner's decision into a course
desirable to an interested outsider. Both
may at least be assumed to be doing their
best to produce a calculation that will
accord with what the forest owner expects
their results to reveal and, on the other
hand, with what the results can reveal.
An analysis of a consultant's calculations
may suggest a framework for the calcula-
tions of the research worker.
3. Analysis of the structural framework of an
investment calculation made by a consul-
tant enables conclusions as the interested
outsiders' possibilities of simulating the
forest owner's decision making process.
It may be pointed out that a consultant, an
adviser commissioned to provide services to
the forest owner alone, is very uncommon in
Finland, unlike e.g. the USA, where inde-
pendent »consulting foresters» form an essen-
tial sector of the forestry professionals. In
Finland, the responsibility of assisting farm
forest owners in decisions on both forestry
and agriculture falls on various instructors,
advisors and the like. They are officials
employed by counselling organizations largely
financed and supervised by the State. Since
these organizations often have connections
with the political interest groups of farmer/
forest owners, this assistance can hardly ever
be entirely free from external influences: in
making their decisions, the forest owners are
probably influenced, at least to a certain
extent, towards taking the course desirable
to the said interested outsiders (state, interest
organizations).
Disregarding the question of whether or
not this type of counselling is desirable, an
investment calculation made by a consultant
independent of all outsiders, is certainly a
useful subject for study. It contains structural
regularities that help to indicate the type of
difficulties that might be created by the other
advisory organizations and to determine the
most purposeful way to organize the coun-
selling.
From now on, the investment calculation
referred to in this paper will be regarded as
one worked out by a consultant. Before
launching this subject, the assumed division
of work between decision maker and consultant
in making the decision must be defined: what
kind of division of work is possible and meets
a useful purpose.
241. Jobs delegated to the consultant
The problem the forest owner/decision
maker presents to the consultant for advice,
may in principle cover the whole decision
making process as it was defined in the fore-
going. In other words, the commission may
start from a precise definition of the problem
and finish with the final choice of the step to
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be taken. However, it is probably rarely
presented as a single commission, leaving
only the responsibility for the final solution
to the forest owner himself. It is apparently
more common for the commission to be
divided into several problems: the collection
and analysis of information to shed light on
the situation, the generation of solution
alternatives, determination of the results to
be expected from the alternatives, and evalu-
ation of the alternatives (cf. MORRIS 1963,
p. 201). The decision maker, after each
phase, decides how the process should be con-
tinued. The consultant's commission may
also be confined — explicitly or implicitly —
to one of the phases. The forest owner, for
example, may ask the consultant for advice
as to which of a given number of alternative
stands it would be best to fertilize.
The extent of the commission delegated to
the consultant probably depends above all on
which of the phases the decision maker
thinks can suitably be delegated to another
person. The deciding factor in the estimation
of suitability is the nature of the specialized
knowledge demanded by the job.
This criterion can be used to divide the
problems of the decision process into two
groups. For example, the generation of action
alternatives and the formulation of their ex-
pected results involve, first and foremost, the
finding of objective, impersonal facts. Setting
aspiration levels represents value judgements,
in which the individual's own feelings are the
decisive factor. The former are often called
factual or empirical, the latter ethic and value
problems. (SIMON 1957, Chapter III; cf.
SCRIVEN 1968, p. 86).
For example, the argument that afforesta-
tion yields income not to the forest owner but
to his children or grandchildren, is empirical,
whereas one according to which the forest
owner in his work ought to consider what is
best for his children and grandchildren, is in
the first place ethic.
Answers to factual problems are, at least
in principle, verifiable by empirical observa-
tions, either directly or with the aid of logic
inference. On the other hand, theorists dis-
agree as to whether normative statements
(see e.g. LIPSEY 1966, pp. 4 7) can be
reduced into empirical statements, and
whether therefore value judgements also can
be objectively derived from facts, that is to
say, verified by observations (see JOHNSON
1960, p. 29; LIPSEY I.e., p. 5 fn; SCRIVEN I.e.,
pp. 86 -87; HUDSON 1969).
In this connection it is not necessary to go
into the details of this philosophical problem.
Whatever the ultimate truth, science cannot,
at the moment, offer a method by which the
reduction of value judgements into empirical
problems could be completely realized. For
practical reasons alone, the ethic and value
proposition solutions associated with decision
making must be separated from those relating
to facts (cf. LIPSEY I.e., p. 5 fn.).
The above does not mean that the con-
sultant might not have to answer questions
related to ethic and general value judgement
problems. The formulation of value judge-
ments is apparently often experienced as a
heavy mental strain, especially if the original
goals are very contradictory (JOHNSON I.e.,
p. 29). Recourse to another person for help is
as natural as in collecting the information as-
sociated with the actions. It is essential, ho-
wever, that in answering such a question the
consultant should work on a different basis
from that used in solving factual problems.
The solution a consultant suggests to an
ethic problem may be interpreted in two
alternative ways. Either it will be the con-
sultant's personal value judgement, or it will
express the opinion he has of the values and
norms prevailing in the decision maker's
reference group. In both cases it represents
information which, according to the above
model, may affect the formulation of the
decision maker's aspiration levels (see p. 16).
Whether, and to what extent, this influence is
decisive or secondary depends ultimately on
the decision maker and his independence.
Provided the foregoing is accepted, the
following conclusions can be drawn concern-
ing the division of work between the decision
maker (forest owner) and the consultant.
Setting the aspiration levels is a task that
is hardly ever delegated to another individual.
Even when the decision maker asks for advice
on his goal problems, it may be taken that he
is looking for additional information on other
people's value judgements rather than a final
definition of aspiration levels. When the con-
sultant's commission is defined it is best to
present and treat questions of aspiration levels
and other integral phases as distinctly separate
part-commissions.
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When the decision maker formulates his
aspiration levels he must make them known
to the consultant in one way or another. Only
after this can the consultant compare them
with achievements or with results to be ex-
pected from the different alternatives. This
information transfer requires time, trouble
and expense, and may frequently involve dis-
turbing error factors (cf. EDWARDS 1954,
p. 24). On the other hand, there may be no
justification for expecting the consultant to
carry out the comparisons — once the
quantities to be compared are known — very
much better than the decision maker. There-
fore this procedure may be unnecessary. The
decision maker should be satisfied when the
consultant furnishes him with the facts con-
cerning his achievements and/or the effects
(results) of the alternatives considered, in a form
that enables their direct comparison with the
relevant aspiration levels. He can, and often
does, carry out the comparison himself.
Information on the consequences of the
alternatives (»expectations» in the above
model), in their primary form, are hard to
compare with the aspiration levels, and this
for two reasons. Firstly, the individual's
achievements and the direct effects of the
alternatives are usually measured and ex-
pressed in terms of dimensions different from
those in which the individual perceives his
aspiration levels or his objectives. Direct
results of forest improvement are changes in
growing stock volume and cutting quantities.
The forest owner's objective may be, for
example, a certain present value of net in-
come and a simultaneous certain minimum
liquidity. Testing the acceptability of activity
alternatives requires that the original in-
formation — the expected consequences of
the action — be first transformed into a form
corresponding to the goal dimensions (aspira-
tion levels). In other words, the consequence
vectors must be projected onto the goal (i.e.,
aspiration) space.
Secondly, the direct use of original infor-
mation is impaired in many cases by the fact
that the action leads to a large number of
direct effects. This is true even after the
elimination of those that, from the decision
maker's point of view, are unessential or
nearly insignificant. Furthermore, the in-
dividual's ability, frequently untrained, of
simultaneously perceiving and comparing in-
formation related to the alternatives is
limited. According to many psychological
studies, it comprises only 5—10 components
and dimensions (see e.g. SHEPARD 1964;
JOHNSEN 1968, pp. 362—365; cf. POLLACK
1968, p. 335). The number of effects must be
reduced, in other words, information must be
condensed (by combination of vectors) before
it can be checked by the decision maker.
The testing of the acceptability of alterna-
tives, which has also been called »evaluation
of alternatives» (e.g. TÖRNQVIST and NORD-
BERG 1968), is therefore divided into three
components: (1) transforming the informa-
tion composed of the expected consequences
of the action, (2) condensing it, and (3)
verifying the acceptability, by comparisons
with aspiration levels, of the information now
in comparable and controllable form. It may
be asserted on the basis of the above that the
decision maker (forest owner) when he asks
the consultant whether a measure is »profit-
table» or which of the given alternatives is
»best», in the first place expects that the con-
sultant will
1. with the aid of his expertise form the
detailed expectations of the effects of
each alternative,
2. transform and condense the information
composed of these expectations into one
or, at the most, a few parameters, and
3. present the information so treated to the
decision maker who, with its aid, finally
decides the acceptability of the alterna-
tives.
The consultant, however, is not only con-
sulted for a comparison of given alternatives
but often already during the search for alter-
natives (e.g. MORRIS 1963, p. 201). In prin-
ciple, the possible procedures meeting the
generator goals (requirements) may be in-
numerable. As already pointed out, the
decision maker, by whatever means he may
use, seeks among them, finds and takes up
for detailed consideration only a few (cf.
SIMON 1964, pp. 8 - 9 ; TÖRNQVIST and NORD-
BERG 1968, p. 13). In his search the decision
maker may resort to observation and imita-
tion of others, to his own ability of innovation
(heuristic methods), or to expert advisers (cf.
JOHNSON et ai. 1961, pp. 29—40; LAUKKANEN
1968, pp. 58-83). The present study deals
with the last-mentioned possibility.
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When approaching a consultant, the de-
cision maker expects him to know, and be
able to evolve, a larger number of chances of
solving the problem efficiently than the
decision maker could himself. The expectation
is based on the consultant's training and
experience. The concept of expertise goes
with detailed and extensive knowledge of the
field of alternatives. Since both research and
the specialist training emphasize a systematic
exploration and a wide knowledge of this
field, this expectation by the decision maker
may be considered well justified.
The commission, however, does not only
consist of the mechanical transferring of in-
formation, since more solution alternatives
can easily be found than the decision maker
wishes, or is able, to take into consideration.
A forest owner who asks for suggestions about
forestry investments to increase his revenue
would not be well served by a list of all
possible combinations of fertilizer types,
fertilizer quantities and fertilizing methods
with the relevant cost and yield calculations,
one by one. The information would be too
abundant, and most forest owners would be
»drowned» in it, incapable of forming an
overall idea of the possibilities required for
decision. The consultant, therefore, must
choose: from among all the solution alterna-
tives that come to his mind, he must screen
those that he expects will be worth pre-
senting.
When the objective is to find action alter-
natives which, in addition to generator goals,
would also meet the decision maker's other,
so-called test goals, elimination is efficient
enough only if the consultant knows all the
decision maker's principal aspirations (aspi-
ration levels) and can by this means define
the alternatives worth proposing.
If the consultant were able to get a clear
picture of the decision maker's aims it would
obviously be beneficial to extend the consul-
tant's commission to cover the final verifi-
cation of the acceptability of the alternatives.
The practical course would be: Having clari-
fied what is expected of the solution, the
consultant would search for possible alterna-
tives, test their acceptability, and inform the
decision maker of his final result, on the basis
of which the decision maker would adjust
his goals. If necessary, i.e. if the goals were
modified, the procedure would be repeated.
However, only a number of the individuals'
goals, or the requirements made of the solu-
tion of the problem, can be easily and pre-
cisely expressed (are operational). The forest
owners often seem to omit mentioning goals
they find »self-evident» or »less honourable»,
or which for other reasons are not recalled
when the commission is outlined (see DORF-
MAN 1966, p. 60).Knowing this, as decision
makers, they usually check and supplement
the testing themselves. This being so, the
consultant is well-advised to use the objec-
tives he has been able to define, according to
the decision maker's suggestions, only as a
guide in defining the field of alternatives, and
in his search for alternatives. He then sub-
mits several alternatives for the decision
maker's consideration, i.e. testing, and does
not just present him with one »correct» alter-
native.
Depending on the situation, the trans-
formation and condensation of information per
alternative, delegated to the consultant, may
therefore also involve cutting down the number
of alternatives submitted for consideration, that
is to say, condensation of the information
concerning the alternatives as such.
242. Investment calculation by the con-
sultant
If the above outlines of decision making
and the consultant's role are accepted, the
investment calculation under review may
justifiably be defined as follows: investment
calculation is calculation in explicit form, in
which or with which information on the direct
consequences of investment alternatives is trans-
formed and condensed to serve in the testing of
the acceptability of the alternatives. The purpose
is to transform and condense the information
into a form in which it can, more easily than
in its original form, be compared with the
requirements made of the solution.
On this basis, the consultant's investment
calculation may now be considered in detail.
The present problem was limited above to
the investment calculation. The words invest-
ment calculation from now on, unless other-
wise stated, refer to a calculation by a con-
sultant, and to the objectives foreseen in it.
As mentioned before, in two types of com-
missions given to the consultant the informa-
tion usually requires treatment, i.e. process-
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ing. He may be requested to propose suitable
investment alternatives which meet the re-
quirements given, or to describe the con-
sequences of one or more given alternatives
in a form suitable for testing. In the former
case the consultant must choose, from among
the alternatives he either finds or already has
in mind, those he wishes to present to the
decision maker. If the consultant seeks to
carry out the selection with a view to the
decision maker's objectives, he must first give
the effects of the alternatives a form suitable
for testing. In other words, he must do as he
does in the latter case. Hence the transforma-
tion and condensation of the effects of invest-
ment alternatives so as to render them fit for
testing may be considered the essential task.
In the following, the investment calculation
is considered primarily as a means used to
transform and condense the information (in-
formation mass) composed of the directly ex-
pected effects of one investment alternative.
It should be noted that, according to the
opinion adopted here, investment calculation
starts from existing information. The con-
sultant has formed his expectations concern-
ing the effects of the investment alternative
studied, especially those he finds of importance
to the decision maker (forest owner). Since each
tangible act apparently has a theoretically
infinite number of consequential effects (in
and around the object), the formation of ex-
pectations is in fact the seeking, selecting,
and eliminating of unessential points. The
result, i.e. the composition of the information
included in the calculation, is affected, among
other things, by the type of consequences to
which the consultant has been used or trained
to pay attention, and by the consultant's
views of the decision maker's goals.
To know the structure of the calculation it
is not, however, essential to know how the
information is composed, or what it contains
in each individual case. It is enough to know
what kind of information the investment
calculation is intended to handle. The present
paper, therefore, will disregard problems the
consultant is confronted with when he com-
poses the information, and will be confined to
an analysis of the transformation and conden-
sation of existing information.
As stated earlier, the problem is two-fold:
the consultant must transform the directly
expected effects to correspond to the decision
maker's goal dimensions and condense the in-
formation into fewer elements. These two
tasks are closely interconnected, and are
usually carried out simultaneously. Never-
theless, in principle they are different.
Transformation moves or projects an in-
dividual effect vector from one subspace to
another (for example, cutting quantity ex-
pressed in terms of technical measurements is
transformed into money income from the
cutting). The result can, if desired, be restored
into information of the original form, pro-
vided the transformer (in example, unit price)
that was used is known.
In condensation, information is combined: a
resultant is formed, in one way or another,
from separate vectors (individual cutting in-
come items are summed). If condensation
must be annulled — the result re-divided into
its components — it is not enough to know
the method of combination used (addition),
but also n-1 of the combined n vectors must
be known. However, the number of elements
in the information should not be changed, and
so the purpose of condensation would not be
fulfilled. In condensation, therefore, some of
the original information is intentionally lost.
In transformation, the quantity of informa-
tion is preserved but its »quality» is changed.
The division of work between decision
maker and consultant as accepted earlier, as-
sumed that the consultant's primary duty is
to search for and transmit empirical factual
information. If the total commission includes
component problems which may be con-
sidered ethical or are otherwise associated
with value judgements,the consultant is ex-
pected to handle and solve them separately.
In extreme detail, the separation of objective
and subjective problem material would imply,
among other things, that the consultant,
while transforming and condensing the infor-
mation — at least in the early phases —
should confine himself to methods based either
on generally acceptable regularities or on evalua-
tions by the decision maker. The consultant
should not suggest his own values.
In practice, however, this strict require-
ment of objectivity must be relaxed. It was
indicated above that the information sup-
plied to the decision maker for testing the
acceptability of an alternative must not con-
tain too many elements. Otherwise the deci-
sion maker is hardly able to make use of the
27
DECISION MAKER
i
Renuirements for
the solution
Search
for alternatives
>
Alternative
to be studied
:
r[_
i
Expected effects \
from alternative
in comparable form I
/Com\
\
CONSULTANT
j
f
--*
Alternative
to be studied
Idea of the \
1 decision maker's I
\ requirements /
Formation of
expectat ions
Investment
>
.alculation
/
/ Expected effects • \ '
1 information to be 1
\ treated /
I
Transformation
Transformed
expectations ,
'"I
Condensation L
i
Transformed and con
densed expectationsi
Supplementary modi-
fication if deemed
necessary
1
Final processed
informat ion
/
Selection of the
transformat ion
belection of the
method of
condensat ion
Fig. 3. The position of investment calculation in the decision making process when the consultant's duty
is limited to the evaluation of the investment alternative.
information, and the expediency of the work
division might be questionable. There is
probably therefore more justification for the
following view of the situation: in treating
the information, the consultant tries, as he is
expected, to find and use methods that are
objective in the above sense of the word, but
he supplements them where necessary with his
subjective deliberation and valuations unless he
can by other means achieve a final result of
sufficiently few elements and dimensions.
After these supplementary assumptions,
and restrictions concerning the situation stud-
ied, the position of investment calculation in
the decision making process can be inter-
preted as shown in Fig. 3. It indicates infor-
mation exchanges (broken lines) between
consultant and decision maker, the consul-
tant's steps towards completing the commis-
sion received, and the exact place of invest-
ment calculation in the commission. Since the
consultant's role in this context was assumed
to be restricted to the evaluation of the alter-
native submitted for consideration, the other
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preceding and succeeding phases of decision
making have not been repeated in the draw-
ing (cf. Fig. 2).
It must be noted that we are here observing
one separate link of the decision process only.
If the result of the comparison (see Fig. 3) is
negative, i.e. if the alternative is not satis-
factory, the decision maker, according to the
previously accepted model (Fig. 2), returns to
the search of alternatives or to the goal set-
ting and a new evaluation process will follow
with a new investment calculation. It may be
a completely new one or just the former cal-
culation with some alterations. There may be
a lot of such successively made and presented
calculations before the final decision is made.
However, in this study we are not interested
in the consulting process as a whole, how it
should be or really is carried on. We are con-
cerned with one single calculation only, ir-
respective of whether it is preceded or fol-
lowed by other calculations.
The reason why we do so is given in the
introduction. The theory is expected to help
in making of investment calculations in a
special situation where the »consultant» (the
researcher) has no possibility to carry on
repeated talks with the forest owner.
25. Precise definition of the study
problem
The above analysis of the interaction be-
tween decision maker (forest owner) and con-
sultant gives an idea of the position and pur-
pose of the investment calculation. Later in
the text it forms the background and frame of
reference for the analysis of the study prob-
lem. With its aid, the original problem can, or
even must, be precisely defined.
In the first study outline, the primary aim
was to investigate how the time factor should
be taken into account in investment calcula-
tions concerned with timber growing in an
economic unit which is owned and controlled
by one physical person and which includes a
forest subunit. Subsequently, a number of
assumptions and conclusions have been made
to confine and simplify the problem further.
The most essential may be repeated here:
1. Investment in the present study refers to
such an integrated series of outlays and
receipts which in terms of time begins with
an (investment) outlay. The results of the
investment are therefore manifest in
changes of the expected revenue (series of
receipts which in terms of time begins with
of the forest owner.
2. The investment calculation is interpreted
as an explicit calculation by means of
which information composed of the direct
or immediate effects of the investment is
transformed and condensed for decision
making into a form easier to compare with
the standards required of the solution than
is the original form.
3. The study analyses the investment calcula-
tion made by a consultant assisting the
decision maker (forest owner-farmer-entre-
preneur). Furthermore, it is assumed that
the information to be treated is primarily
associated with one investment alternative
at a time.
4. Treatment is divided into two phases,
transformation and condensation, which
will be separately analysed further below.
The consultant is expected to observe, as
far as possible, procedures based either on
universally applicable laws or on the
evaluations of the decision maker (forest
owner).
After these additions, the study problem
may be considered to have been defined. It is
proposed to find the answer to the question of
how the time factor, or the temporal dif-
ferences in the changes of the series of out-
lays and receipts, should be taken into ac-
count in calculations by which the consultant
assisting the forest owner transforms and
condenses the information he has evolved or
obtained on the expected effects of invest-
ments in timber growing in the forest unit,
so that this information will be in a form the
forest owner can directly compare with his
objectives.
As agreed previously, the solution sought is
a theory of how to take into account the time
factor in the investment calculation made by
the consultant. This theory is to be presented
in a form which, unmodified, is applicable to
all investments, and not only timber growing
investments, of the economic unit concerned.
Some of the problems arising when the theory
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is put into practice, especially those in timber
growing, are also to be discussed. Th elatter
section will, however, be relatively general.
Two points deserve special emphasizing.
Both are results of the choices made when
constructing the frame of reference.
1. The investment calculation which will be
analyzed in the following has nothing to do
with optimizing.
2. The methods which could be used in the
simultaneous comparison of several alter-
natives or in the planning of whole invest-
ment processes will neither be discussed.
The modern investment theory litterature
is heavily concentrated in the development of
such optimization models and techniques. In
this study however we have quite another
problem to be solved. We are not asking what
is the best choice of investment; we are asking
what is the right way to present the informa-
tion of a possible investment.
3. DEVELOPING THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT CALCULATION
The frame of reference outlined above con-
nects the investment calculation with two
concepts which have not been precisely
defined yet: the »direct effects» of the invest-
ment, and the »individual's objectives or
goals». They must now be given an unambigu-
ous content. Their connection with the third,
so far undefined pair of terms — »receipt» and
»outlay» — must also be determined. From
the point of view of the plot of this study, it is
best to define the receipt and outlay concepts
last.
31. Direct effects of investment and
the individual's objectives, and
their relationship to time factor
Let us first borrow some concepts and
models of the system theory (cf. ASHBY 1960;
SEALE 1966, pp. 1—20; PULLIAINEN 1967,
p. 20; PALO 1967, pp. 19—21). The universe
surrounding the individual may be considered
to consist of various elements — i.e., things,
materials, animals, plants, people, money,
buildings, machines etc. — and their attributes
and mutual relationships which, in addition to
various interactions, contain all size, quan-
tity, ownership, value, power etc. relations.
Those elements, attributes and relationships
discussed here, which may be termed as
relevant for the individual, are called the
indivudual's environment.
Closely interconnected elements, with at-
tributes and relationships, are perceived as
such or as groups; for example, a building,
machines and the people operating the
machines form a factory, individual trees a
stand, a number of calculations on paper
constitute bookkeeping, etc. These entities
are called by the general name system.
Defining a system against other elements
and relationships is more or less conventional
and depends both on the defining person and
also on the angle of approach. An element or
relationship may simultaneously belong to
several systems, parallel or hierarchically
graded. A tree, for example, can be viewed as
part of a stand, a forest unit or a larger
forest region, but also as part of the scenery,
part of the watershed, part of the outdoor
recreation surroundings, etc. All elements and
relationships, in principle, are related to ele-
ments, attributes and relationships outside
their respective systems. Usually, however,
the system is perceived as an entity whose
outward relationships are relationships of the
entity. The network of elements and relation-
ships within the system is not recognized at
all, either because detailed perception is not
considered necessary, or because the content
of the system is not known. In the latter case,
the system is a so-called black box (see p. 17).
Even in a fairly small group of elements the
number of relationships between elements is
very high. If this fact is viewed against the
limited human capacity, as indicated before,
of perceiving and handling simultaneous rela-
tionships (SHEPARD 1964, pp. 257, 263—267;
JOHNSEN 1968, pp. 362—365), it is evident
that the individual can only recognize a very
small proportion, at a time, of all the ele-
ments and relationships surrounding him.
Perception of systems is a means of reducing
the number of the relationships to be re-
cognized, yet the number of the remaining
relationships easily exceeds the individual's
capacity. For this reason the relationships the
individual, for one reason or another, con-
siders essential, are screened from the crowd.
The individual's recognized environment is
therefore necessarily a very simplified idea of
the network of elements, their attributes and
relationships which »in reality» surround him.
The picture an outsider perceives of the
individual's environment is also subjectively
reduced. Although the persons concerned
may, by discussions, be able to bring their
views considerably closer, it is questionable
whether they ever are able to perceive a
situation in exactly the same way.
An investment, whether it is made for
establishment of a business enterprise, pur-
chase of a machine, purchase of a supply of
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raw material, clearing of land for cultivation,
construction of a forest truck road, exchange
of securities, or any event whatsoever that
can be interpreted as investment, always in-
volves changing the condition of a system —
the individual's livelihood, factory, produc-
tion line, farm, forest unit, property, and the
like. Primarily the changes take place in
elements and relationships within the system,
but they appear outwardly as changes in
relationships between the system and the
environment or its component parts —
elements, attributes, relationships and sys-
tems, in other words, as system output. This is
further reflected in the mutual relationships
of the parts »at a distance» from the system.
As stated above, defining a system is
arbitrary and therefore subjective. Even the
same individual may find various solutions to
a problem, depending on how essential certain
elements or relationships seem each time.
Differences between two individuals are even
more probable. The consultant is unlikely
ever to perceive the investment, or the sys-
tem for which it is intended, in exactly the
same way as the decision maker.
In the field so delineated, the »direct ef-
fects» of an investment are difficult to define
exactly, unless the definition is somehow con-
nected with a given person. For this reason,
in the present study,
the direct effects of investment refer to the
system output obtained through investment
made in the system, as perceived by the
observing party — the decision maker him-
self or the consultant.
The definition must be reconsidered after
elucidating the concept of the »individual's
goal».
Goal-oriented behaviour, both in economics
and psychology, is usually explained as
arising from the individual's needs or wants
which he seeks to satisfy. The definition of a
need says that it is a goal-oriented mental or
inner force in man (RAINIO 1955, p. 14, cf.
VERNON 1969, p. 1). Several opinions have
been advanced concerning the detailed nature
and origin of this force.
The model of the decision making process
(cf. p. 19) serving as the frame of reference
agrees perhaps most logically with the theory
that the individual, in his physical and
psychical activities, seeks to maintain homeo-
stasis or a homeostatic development, and
whenever homeostasis is disrupted he feels
the need to restore it by suitable behaviour.
For example, reduced temperature of the skin
surface (»cold») creates a need to restore the
temperature, and thirst, or the need for liq-
uid, develops when the liquid balance of the
body is disturbed (MORGAN 1956, p. 84; NUM-
MENMAA et al. 1963, p. 432). A need is there-
fore preceded by an external or internal
stimulus disturbing homeostasis.
The physiological needs make up the lowest
layer of needs. Having to meet a need repeat-
edly, the individual quickly picks up the
actions which regularly lead to the desired
result, and more generally, the conditions in
which this takes place. These conditions
create new secondary, or learned needs. From
childhood onwards a man's motives become
diversified, and various social and egocentric
needs arise alongside the original physiologi-
cal needs. (MORGAN I.e., p. 84; NUMMENMAA
et al., I.e., p. 432; LEAVITT 1964, p. 27; ENGEL
et al., 1968, p. 118).
The literature contains a large number of
detailed classifications of needs. Authors have
based their systematizations on slightly dif-
ferent views concerning the minuteness of the
classification and the mutual importance of
the actions characterizing the needs. ENGEL
et al.'s (I.e., p. 67) six classes may serve as an
example: physiological motives, safety mo-
tives, belongingness and love motives, esteem
and status motives, and self-actualization mo-
tive. MADSEN (1959, p. 330) has sixteen clas-
ses: the primary motives of hunger, thirst,
sexuality, caring, heat, pain-avoiding, excre-
tion, oxygen, rest and action, the emotional
motives of security and aggression, and the
secondary motives of contact, achievement,
appreciation and possession. RAINIO (1955,
p. 21), a Finnish social psychologist, distin-
guished seven basic needs which he traces
back, hierarchically, to one basic need, the
need of survival.
Besides the social and egocentric »basic»
needs, the individual's process of learning
creates a further differentiation of needs. As a
result of the repeated satisfaction of a need the
individual may learn that hunger is best
satisfied — in given conditions — with pea
soup; afterwards the need the individual di-
rectly recognizes may be that of pea soup or
perhaps, more precisely still, of Super X pea
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soup. RAINIO (I.e., p. 45) calls these learned
needs (or goals) individual needs as distinct
from the basic needs common to all (see also
NUMMENMAA et al., I.e., pp. 85—86).
The study of motives, however, is difficult
because this is a typical black box pheno-
menon. The only thing that can be observed in
certain conditions is the behaviour, and the
impulse or impulses which seem to produce it.
How the impulses in the human mind are
transformed into behavioral reactions, and
especially why a given impulse in different
cases produces different responses, must be
explained by means of variables, so-called
organism variables, which cannot really be
observed but can be inferred from impulse-
response connections (NUMMENMAA et al., I.e.,
pp. 60 and 80; ENGEL et al., I.e., p. 61, JOHNSEN
1968, p. 307). This leaves a very broad margin
for the researcher's subjective interpretations.
Although the above is by no means an ex-
haustive review of the results of motivation
study (cf. e.g. NUMMENMAA et al., I.e., JOHN-
SEN I.e., pp. 302—331; VERNON 1969), it may
provide an adequate background for the fol-
lowing more or less postulate-like conclusions
concerning the individual's goals.
An individual's activity — when it is goal-
oriented — is affected by one or more internal
or organism variables, which may be termed
needs or motives. (Many other terms have also
been used.) So far, however, psychology has
been unable to offer any universally accepted
explanation for the origin and intercorrela-
tions of these variables, or a method for the
direct measurement of the variables.
If psychology is unable to explain the »ulti-
mate» motives of an individual's activities, it
is logical to assume that the individual him-
self cannot either. In other words, the goals an
individual recognizes as his goals in a given
instance, must be accepted as his real goals. The
named goal may be an intermediate goal, a
means of achieving another more distant goal.
But if the individual does not perceive the
situation like this, no outside observer is
justified to assume other goals. This is espe-
cially the case when the observer is assisting
the individual in the decision making and not
forecasting his actions.
The expressed needs of an individual are
diverse, and vary depending on the person and
situation. Some goals are connected with com-
modities and services, others less tangibly
with activities. The object may consist of the
dirct results, or the indirect effects of an ac-
tivity, or the activity itself. The goals must be
defined broadly enough to cover all these pos-
sibilities.
The system-theoretical model described
above provides the framework for a definition
to meet this criterion.
In addition to element, relationship, system
and environment, we may introduce the
concepts state of environment and state of
individual. They refer here to a precise qualita-
tive and quantitative description of the at-
tributes and relationships of the elements
(systems) in environment and within the in-
dividual as perceived by the individual.
The direct effects of an investment were
defined above as changes in the relationships
between the object system and its environ-
ment. Similarly, it is feasible and appropriate
to interpret the individual's goals as changes he
seeks to produce in his own state and/or that of
his environment.
The efforts towards change may be directed
to one or more elements, systems or relation-
ships of the environment and within the in-
dividual. The goal may also be any change of
state without a defined target. The number
and type of goals is determined separately in
each case, e.g. according to the stimuli which
led to the recognition of the goals, and ac-
cording to the type of effort that the individ-
ual, responding to various stimuli and combi-
nations of stimuli, has learnt to use in order to
change the state. On the basis of what was said
earlier, however, it may be assumed that there
is usually more than one goal, and that the
total number does not exceed what the indi-
vidual is capable of perceiving and handling at
the same time (cf. JOHNSEN 1968, p. 373).
The goals set are therefore subjective, not
only as concerns the level or extent of the
change desired, but also as concerns the kind
of the goals. In order to define the calculation
situation precisely the individual must get a
clear picture of the goals, separately in both
these aspects, for himself and the consultant.
On the other hand, the individual's and the
consultant's ideas, of the individual's environ-
ment and investment are hardly ever com-
pletely identical, although they may be
brought closer by exchange of ideas. The
individual is unlikely to be able to transmit
to the consultant a complete picture of the
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changes he desires (cf. also p. 25). For this
reason it is justified to add to the definition
of these goals »as the observing party — deci-
sion maker or consultant — recognizes them.»
Both the above definitions of effect and
goal, and actually the whole model, are in-
complete for the purpose of the study in that
they contain no time factor, the most essential
part of the problem.
Investment and its consequences are not
simultaneous. Every change in the object
system and its environmental relationships
has its given temporal sequence compared
with the other changes. Also the reflection of
system output elsewhere in the environment
takes place with a shorter or longer time lag.
These viewpoints can be included in the
model by giving the concept »state» a time
dimension: the individual, environment, sys-
tems and elements are in a given state at a
given moment. The environment, for example,
chronologically seen, consists of a number of
consecutive states of the environment. The
environment, in a way, moves from one state
to another with time.
The direct effects of investment, the invest-
ment output, is therefore composed of changes
in relationships which, in addition to charac-
teristics indicating quality and size, also have
a »date». In principle, the »date» can be under-
stood either literally as a given exact point of
time — a moment when the change seems to
take place at a single leap — or a period of
time in the course of which the relationship
gradually becomes new. Some effects of
investment (e.g. the purchase of a power saw)
clearly represent the former type, others again
the latter (e.g. the wear and tear of the power
saw). Neither interpretation, therefore, can be
excluded a priori.
Again, however, the individual's limited
capacity of perceiving and handling informa-
tion must be recalled. Man may be able to
imagine, in principle, an almost infinite num-
ber of different points of time, but if he must
perceive them simultaneously, the limit is
very soon reached. Since a man cannot, in the
classification of attributes, consistently use
more than 7 (5—9) classes (LUCE and RAIFFA
1957, p. 37; cf. JOHNSEN 1968, p. 373), it is
hardly presumable that time should be an
exception. In other words, an individual is un-
likely to use many more than 7 »dates» of
sigifnicance. Everyday experience and intro-
spection also provide evidence: for events,
people use time epithets (»today», »tomorrow»,
»next week», »in October», »next year», and so
on) of an increasing looseness as the interval
from the event grows. »After two years» is
almost without exception a broad class rather
than a precise point of time. In the following,
therefore, it will be hypothesized that the indi-
vidual, when forming an idea of investment
output, divides the time, appropriately for
each respective case, into a limited number of
periods, and groups or »dates» the events in
his mind according to these periods which
presumably are hardly more than ten.
Hence investment output is composed of a
series of changes timed according to a given
time classification — which depends on the
respective case and observing party — that is to
say, of the output of the system in which
investment is made »as the observing party
concerned perceives it».
Time is similarly connected with the indi-
vidual's goals: the individual seeks to produce
»dated» changes and times his goals within the
time period classification indicated. The goals,
too, are therefore grouped into one or maxi-
mum 5—10 time classes.
The goals were interpreted above as changes
of the existing states. The addition of timing
necessitates a precise definition. In the fol-
lowing, state changes are understood as those
changes taking place in the states of individual
or environment at different dates as compared
with the states that would prevail if no invest-
ment were made.
The question of the time dimension of the
series of states, the distance of the so-called
horizon, will be discussed later. It may already
be said, however, that like any limitation of
the environment, its temporal limitation also
is arbitrary.
32. Limitations of investment calcula-
tion
The definitions of the direct effects of in-
vestment and the individual's (forest owner's)
goals connect these concepts closely to the
subjective ideas of the respective observing
party. The party (e.g. the consultant) com-
pares the effects of investment, such as he
recognized them, with the individual's goals,
again such as he recognized them.
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The two quantities compared have been
defined as changes inside an individual, i.e. in
his mind, or in his environment. These
changes, however, do not necessarily or
generally involve identical elements ,systems
or relationships. The essence of comparison,
and of investment calculations, is to determine
what changes the investment output will
produce in the elements, systems and/or rela-
tions the individual seeks to change.
The person who compares — the individual
himself or an outsider — forms in his mind an
idea of relationships, elements and systems by
means of which this output is reflected to the
other parts of the individual's environment
and to the individual himself, especially how-
ever to goal variables. This idea is applied to
determine the reply to the problem.
In principle, formation of this idea and its
application may take place implicitly. For the
decision maker himself this may be the most
common way. In the present problem, how-
ever, as outlined above, the concern is limited
to explicit calculations by which the consultant
processes information on investment output
to make it serviceable for the decision maker
(forest owner). The limitations these basic
assumptions impose on an explicit calculation
must, therefore, be considered separately.
An explicit calculation presupposes that the
variables contained therein are operational,
i.e. that these attributes and relationships can
be measured and expressed numerically. This
standard is not met by changes in the indi-
vidual's (internal) state (cf. p. 32 above, com-
ment on the lack of measuring methods for
organism variables). The individual may
report that he is hungry, in other words, has
an internal force or need, termed hunger, re-
quiring satisfaction. But he cannot express the
intensity of this feeling or force except by
stating the quantity of food he expects will
suffice to satisfy the need (»I am so hungry
that I could eat . . .»). Such an indirect yard-
stick gives the consultant an indication of the
individual's (forest owner's) relative needs but
does not express the absolute degree of their
intensity.
It follows from the foregoing that the con-
sultant cannot trace the reflex effects of the
output back to the changes in the decision
maker's internal emotions. He must try to
find the environmental changes. If the decision
maker has adopted goals involving a change
in his internal state, the consultant must try
to find the environmental elements or rela-
tionships the decision maker can easily com-
bine with his internal goals.
Some of the investment output may lead to
a change in the individual's internal state
without intermediate phases. Examples are
e.g. various esthetically experienced changes
in the object system of the investment. They
need no calculations; the investment output
alone is enough, provided it is explicitly
expressed.
The investment calculation, therefore, can-
not contain even most of the changes which
might be compared in each case. For a uni-
versal definition, the investment calculation
must be considered a partial calculation. The
investment output contained in the calcula-
tions, and the calculation results, at least often
if not regularly, are only a part of the informa-
tion necessary or relevant for the decision
maker's solution.
The coverage of the calculation is further
reduced by the following feature character-
istic of calculation situations. Some of the
environmental relationships are so-called con-
ditional relationships: their implementation
depends on the individual's (decision maker's)
later solutions. The consultant can calculate
the reflex effects of investment output on such
a conditional relationship with the aid of
general technical, biological and economic
regularities, but from then onwards he must
know how the decision maker will choose to
continue in the future. In one way or another,
the consultant must obtain this information
from the decision maker. Otherwise he must
stop his calculation at this relationship and
let the decision maker personally complete
the processing of the balance of the infor-
mation.
This way of viewing the investment calcula-
tion has two limitations which must be ex-
pressly emphasized:
1. Investment calculation is inseparable from
the requirement that it must be operational,
and therefore it usually cannot contain all
information relevant for decision making.
2. The structure of an investment calculation
depends essentially on the situation in which
the calculation is made and particularly on
the definition of goals in each particular
case.
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33. Outlays and receipts in invest-
ment calculation
The limitation of investment calculation to
operationally definable changes in the object
system of the investment and in the environ-
ment requires increased precision of some of
the definitions above.
Not all direct effects of investment, i.e. the
investment output (actually the output of the
decision to invest) will be discussed in the
present investment calculations. Only those
representing quantitative changes of commo-
dities, services and means of payment owned by
or available to the forest owner-decision maker
will be analysed. Investment output may con-
tain many other, intangible consequences,
difficult to measure, such as the influence of
forest drainage investment on the forest
owner's relations with his neighbours, or vari-
ous esthetic changes in the environment with
a direct effect on its amenity. The decision
maker gives them particular attention before
deciding to invest.
The information the consultant can trans-
form and condense in the investment calcula-
tions is composed of a number of positive and
negative changes in the forest owner-decision
maker's receiving and relinquishing of com-
modities, services and means of payment. For
instance, information connected with invest-
ment in a farm tractor may contain data on
the price, consumption of fuel etc. (or a
change in consumption if an old tractor is to
be replaced with a new one), changes in the
labour input needed, a change in the quantity
of products completed (if a tractor is to be
used only for productive work on the farm),
and sales income to be obtained when the
tractor is scrapped. If the decision maker buys
all fuel etc. and all work (i.e., production
inputs) and sells all products, each of these
events implies a subsequent monetary pay-
ment. In other words, the decision maker
either hands out or receives money and other
means of payment. This being so, the calcu-
lations may be based on, and the »physical»
events as »direct» results of investment can be
replaced with, the positive and negative changes
expected in the monetary assets, or »cash» (SAA-
RIO 1965, pp. 47—49) of the decision maker.
This procedure — reduction of investment
output into receipts and outlays — corres-
ponds to the content earlier given to the con-
cept of investment (cf. Chapter 21). A charac-
teristic of the investment of an economic unit
of the kind now studied is, however, that the
forest owner often does not buy all the produc-
tion inputs (input increases) required or sell
all his production (production increases),
consuming at least a part thereof. In calcula-
tions priority is given to transactions in terms
of money. »Inputs in kind» (e.g. the work done
by the forest owner and his family) and
»receipts in kind» (wood for household con-
sumption; potatoes, milk, cereals etc. used in
family household) are given suitable prices.
This conversion may be considered the first
phase in transforming and condensing in-
formation to make changes of varying kind
»commensurable».
The selection of the coefficients (»prices»)
used in conversion and especially the terms of
objective conversion are essential problems
for the theory of investment calculations. The
present writer has discussed these problems
transiently in another context (M. KELTI-
KANGAS 1969, pp. 84—85). The particular
purpose of the present study, however, is to
analyse the conversion calculations connected
with the time differences between the changes.
Therefore the »timeless» conversion problems
will be left unconsidered here.
For the same reason the problems the con-
sultant faces in delineating the object system
of the investment and hence also its output
will be disregarded. For example, effects of an
investment in a forest motor road are usually
confined to the particular productive work,
timber harvesting, for which the road is con-
structed. Especially by means of the necessary
production input transfers the investment
may produce changes in the decision maker's
other activities in or even outside the same
forest unit (cf. SAARI 1942, p. 29). The consul-
tant is supposed to have taken the essential
aspects into account when he determined the
changes expected in the decision maker's mon-
etary resources, as indicated above.
Thus, it will be assumed in the following that
the information processed contains only changes
in money, or more correctly, expected changes.
If the decision maker, without the invest-
ment, can except a series of monetary pay-
ments »to and from cash», or a cash flow, the
results of the investment are visible in that
some payments (»to or from cash») fall out,
diminish or grow, and their number increases.
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These cash receipts and cash outlays will be
called cash flow components in the following:
the former are positive and the latter negative
components.
The changes mentioned above are, accor-
dingly, changes in the decision maker's (total)
cash flow, in brief cash flow changes. Those
increasing the »cash», or money available to
the decision maker, are positive and those
reducing it are negative cash flow changes.
The expectations making up the informa-
tion to be transformed and condensed are,
according to the terminology just accepted,
cash flow change expectations. Each is con-
nected with information on the trend ( + or
—) of the cash flow change, its date, and the
degree of uncertainty of the expectation.
When cash flow changes are presented in
chronological order, they are called a series of
cash flow changes. These terms will be used in
the following.
Cash flow changes directly produced by the
investment are usually not the only cash
transactions. A number of secondary pay-
ments (cash flow changes) usually follow, and
by their means the »direct» effects of the
investment are converted into the changes the
decision maker desired. An analysis of these
secondary results is best started by a short
outline of the structure of ideas used by
FISHER (1930, cf. also HIRSHLEIFER 1958;
HONKO 1959, pp. 40—42).
FISHER'S opening statement is that an
individual's psychical experiences in his mind,
i.e. the individual's inner events, represent the
ultimate income. Outside events are of im-
portance to the individual only insofar as they
are means to inner events. This ultimate in-
come is termed by FISHER the psychic income
or enjoyment income (I.e., pp. 3—4).
The psychic income is subjective. An out-
sider is completely incapable of measuring it
directly. For this reason FISHER also defines
an »objective» income concept, real income.
This is composed of the final outside events
such as »the music of radio, the use of clothes,
the eating of food, the reading of the news-
paper», etc., which create inner enjoyment
(I.e., pp. 5—6).
Even real income is not a highly operational
concept, for these outside events have no
common denominator. It would be awkward
to operate with a list of heterogenous events.
Besides, an outsider would not even come to
know them all. For this reason FISHER (I.e.,
pp. 6—7) takes one further step and measures
the real income with the cost it requires, with
the cost of living.
The real income so expressed in terms of
money differs from the »most usual» concept
of income which FISHER calls money income.
According to his definition it is the money
received by the individual less reserves for a
re-investment. Money income may exceed the
cost of living (i.e., consumption), and the
individual saves the difference and increases
his property or capital. But it may also be
smaller than consumption, in which case he
covers the difference by consuming or »eating»
his capital (I.e., pp. 10—11).
However, FISHER does not accept capital
changes in his concept of income and therefore
rejects monetary income. Psychic income to
him is true income, and other concepts are
intended for its operational approximation.
Income, therefore, is only an outside event
which almost simultaneously is realized in
events implying psychic income. Capital, and
capital changes, promise future psychic in-
come, and they may be considered income
only after the realization has taken place (cf.
SAARIO 1945, p. 28). In this way FISHER
arrives at his operational definition realized
income = consumption. (FISHER I.e., pp. 25—
28; cf. HONKO 1959, pp. 40—42). (An outlay,
according to FISHER, can always be inter-
preted as negative income.)
The interconnection between the concept of
cash flow changes in the present study and the
concepts used by FISHER is the following. The
cash flow changes mean changes in the »cash»
or money available to the individual at a given
time. The increases in the cash are either
consumed during the same period, i.e. con-
verted into real income increases as FISHER
puts it, or they are saved. Decreases in the
cash are covered by reducing consumption
during the period in question and/or by
drawing on existing savings, or by borrowing.
If saving, according to FISHER, is interpreted
as postponement of consumption to later
date(s), cash flow changes may be said actually
to result in changes of individual consump-
tion (FISHER'S real income) during the same
and other periods. The distribution of these
changes between periods depends on how the
individual decides to use or cover, i.e. finance,
the cash flow change.
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The above reminds one of the definition of
interrelationship between money income and
real income but is not identical with it. The
unconsumed saving in cash flow change is
money which during the period really occurs
as cash, no matter whether spent on buying
new pieces of property, lent to others or left as
cash. The unconsumed money income — ac-
cording to FISHER'S definition — is a quantity
obtained when the calculative reserve equal-
ling the reduction in the value of property is
subtracted from this saving to be used for re-
investment.
Of the other two concepts defined by
FISHER, the psychic income equals what was
above called changes in the individual's inter-
nal state. It may be interpreted as synonym-
ous with the term more generally used in
economic theory, need satisfaction. (See e.g.
BOULDING 1955, pp. 680—681; COCHRANE and
BELL 1956, pp. 79—80; SCHNEIDER 1962,
p. 2). The nonoperationality of these concepts
was already discovered in the preceding
chapter.
The present study will do well to accept
from FISHER'S concepts only the real income
measurable in money which, for the sake of
clarity, will be simply called consumption in
the following. The effects of investment are first
manifested by the decision maker's cash flow
changes, i.e. changes in cash receipts and cash
outlays, and second by consumption changes.
Effects of investment experienced as »in kind»
inputs and income are directly comparable to
consumption changes. Relationships between
a series of cash flow changes and the cor-
responding series of consumption changes are,
however, so-called conditional relationships:
they depend on decisions concerning the use
of income. It is theoretically possible that the
individual in some cases will refrain from
using the cash flow changes to create con-
sumption changes. If so, the series of cash flow
changes is not accompanied by a series of con-
sumption changes.
34. Time factor in the transformation
and condensation of a series of
cash flow changes
On the basis of what was said above the
transformation and condensation of informa-
tion can be reduced as follows:
The consultant has either been informed of,
or determined himself, n separate cash flow
changes which are to be the »direct» expected
monetary effects of investment, each »dated»
according to the date, or actually the period t,
when it is expected.
Each expected change in cash flow is to
some extent uncertain, but this extent and
its effects will be discussed further below.
In consecutive order according to their
timing, adding together those with the same
»date», these cash flow changes form a series
of cash flow changes
(1) A I = A Ii, A la,
= {It}, (t = l
A I
Similarly the forest owner-decision maker
whom the consultant assists, has a goal set
(2) G = {GO, (i = 1 . . . q),
composed of one or more changes the decision
maker wishes to make in the states of his
environment. Each must be understood to
have its »date» in the same way as the cash
flow changes. A number of these goals may
be of a type not directly, or only very secon-
darily influenced by cash flow changes. The
balance forms a subset.
(3) G' e G,
which also contains one or more changes
sought.
Goal variable as used in the following will
refer to elements and relationships the forest
owner-decision maker wishes to change.
Change goal is used to indicate the extent of
change desired in the goal variable. The term
»goal» contains both attributes implicitly.
The consultant's duty is to help the decision
maker to form an idea of the extent of the
change in goal variables corresponding to cash
flow change series A I. To this end the con-
sultant forms for himself an idea of the
decision maker's goal subset G', or at least its
goal variables. The same applies to the corre-
lation and correlation chains combining cash
flow changes with the changes in goal va-
riables. With the aid of these correlations he
transforms and condenses, in the investment
calculation, the series of cash flow changes
into changes measured in goal variables. The
consultant, however, is unable to transform
and condense the information finally if a
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number of the correlations are unknown or
too conditional. He then takes recourse to
auxiliary variables or auxiliary goals which
are operational and which he assumes to be
closely connected with the decision maker's
goals. In other words, he replaces G' with G",
which is the operational equivalent of G'.
To do his task, the consultant must there-
fore know the forest owner-decision maker's
goals, auxiliary goals if any, and the said cor-
relations. These together determine the form of
the investment calculation used.
For general instructions as to the form of
investment calculations, regularities should
be sought in the goals of the individuals and
in correlations between goals and cash flow
changes.
Both problems are at least partly empirical;
no final answer can be found by deduction.
Deduction, however, helps to outline possible
goals and the associated possible forms of
calculation relatively well. After the limita-
tions imposed above, the questions can be
re-worded:
1. What are the possible, operational goals
obviously correlated with cash flow
changes?
2. What is this correlation like in each case?
The literature on economic theories provides
a plentiful material, both of observations and
ideas based on pure reasoning, from which
answers can be sought.
The profit is a goal that has become classi-
cal. Profit has been defined very differently in
the course of time (MCGUIRE 1964, p. 48).
It may be considered to date back to the
usage adopted in accountancy in the 17th
century and preserved to this day, according
to which profit is the net increase in the assets
of an enterprise which has arisen during the
fiscal period (before distribution of dividends).
(Cf. HONKO 1959, pp. 119—122; SAARIO 1965,
p. 175). The underlying idea is apparently
that enterprise is property whose value the
owner seeks to increase continuously. Many,
perhaps most of the later concepts of profit
have apparently arisen from attempts to
evolve an operational interpretation which in
each respective calculation situation, theoreti-
cal or tangible, would sufficiently correspond
to the original idea. Or from attempts to build
up a criterion which would express the in-
crease an individual transaction has brought
about in the result of the enterprise in a whole
fiscal year.
The introduction of the concept of profit in
the above sense is connected with another
accounting usage, the separation of the
economy of an enterprise from that of its
owners. While enterprise and owner in 17th
century accountancy still formed an indivisi-
le whole, by the late 19th century it was a
general custom to consider the enterprise an
independent institution, separate from its
owner (HONKO I.e., pp. 118 and 128). In this
way profit came to represent the goal for an
impersonal enterprise.
The effect of this procedure is seen in eco-
nomic theory in that the individual's earning
activities (production) and his household
activities (consumption) have traditionally
been separated. The economic result and its
use become separate problems, the former
discussed in the isolated sphere of an im-
personal enterprise and the latter in one of
consumption linked with the individual. They
are separated by a borderline across which the
enterprise hands over dividends to its owner,
and less frequently also refunds him for work
or raw material inputs received. How the
money and/or produce received — or taken,
if seen from a different angle — by the owner
is used is of no direct interest to the enterprise.
Nor does the household economy inquire about
the ways by which the dividends were
obtained.
When this model prevails the dividends,
especially their amount, become the common
interest of owner and enterprise. The profit
is considered to indicate how much dividends
the enterprise can distribute without changing
its assets or capital value. The higher the profit
the higher the dividends. With a good profit,
it is also easier for the enterprise to meet the
owner's dividend expectations without jeop-
ardizing continuity. Profit growing, there-
fore, is desirable for both economies.
The strict separation of earnings and con-
sumption is, however, artificial in so-called
one-man enterprises, which are the sole object
of this study. Earning and consumption run
parallel and each involves the other. The cash
to and from which the payments flow is the
same, and decisions are interconnected. For
this reason, economists have also sought to
develop theories according to which the solu-
tions in earning activity are derived from the
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entrepreneur's decisions concerning consump-
tion, or are at least made simultaneously.
Most of these theories (see e.g. HIRSHLEIFER
1958; FLORA 1966; HÄLLSTEN 1966), in one
way or another, are based on the study by
FISHER mentioned in the preceding chapter,
and on the ideas it presents. The most essential
of these are the assumptions that the individ-
ual's goal is consumption (in FISHER'S terms,
real income measured by cost of living, cf.
Chapter 33), and that he invests in order to
modify the time distribution of consumption
(FISHER 1930, pp. 112—116; HIRSHLEIFER
I.e., p. 330).
Accepting income, FISHER rejects property
or capital changes as the direct goal of an
enterprise. Increase in the value of property
is not income; income consists of the con-
sumption items that can be expected from
property and on which the value of property
(the capital value) is based (FISHER I.e.,
pp. 12—15; cf. Chapter 33 above).
In FISHER'S opinion, however, the individ-
ual's ultimate goal is not consumption but
psychic income. Consumption is a means or a
channel to achieving psychic income, but it is
not the only one. FISHER admits this inci-
dentally in a footnote, saying that the indi-
vidual, in addition to obvious income, may
also obtain other »less tangible and more
subtle» psychic incomes in the form of pres-
tige, power, sense of possession etc. accom-
panying »great» wealth (FISHER I.e., p. 27 fn).
Yet he does not draw the conclusion one
might expect: in some cases, both consumption
and property may be important and desirable
to the individual, simultaneously and inde-
pendently.
In addition to these, recent investigations
have devoted attention to certain other goals
closely or loosely connected with income and
income changes. In his thorough analysis of
the goals and goal setting in forestry HERMAN-
SEN (1961, 1964) especially mentions liquidity
which may be interpreted both as convert-
ibility of property into money and as contin-
uity of income available for consumption (e.g.,
v. MALMBORG 1967, p. 31). He also mentions
certainty which has different interpretations.
If it is accepted that goal assumptions and
usages (conventions) in economic theory and
practical accountancy cannot have originated
and been preserved without any foundation of
reality, then it may be concluded, even from
the foregoing brief discussion, that an indiv-
ual's goals (G') may in different cases contain
at least the following: changes in consumption,
changes in properly or assets, changes in
liquidity, and changes in the certainty of ex-
pectations. Depending on the situation, they
may occur individually or several at a time.
Of these goals, only change in consumption
has so far been defined umambiguously and
operationally. Property, liquidity, and cer-
tainty are less tangible and conceal a number
of different operational interpretations. Their
analysis is best carried out together with that
of the interdependences of the relevant goals
and income changes.
341. Change in consumption as goal of
investment
Let us first study the cases in which the
decision maker's indicated goal is to increase
consumption, i.e. the share of returns spent
on buying consumer goods and services, in one
or several periods. The goal set G' then con-
tains the consumption change series
4) A C = A Ci, A C2 AC
- {A Ct}, (t = 1 . . . . s),
either alone or together with other goals. The
timing accords with the moment of purchase,
although the actual using up of a commodity,
and the formation of psychic income, may
take place later or be divided over a number of
periods (consumer durables).
The consultant may be informed of the
goals either by a trend being indicated — »the
decision maker wishes to increase consumption
in period t» — or from an exact aspiration
level: »consumption in period t should increase
with a marks». In the latter case, the form
might be »by a minimum of a marks». If
several periods are involved, the changes
desired may be equal or varying. The possi-
bilities are many, and each deserves to be dis-
cussed separately.
Let us start with the goal for one period. The
investment calculation is then based on a
series of cash flow changes
A Ii, A Is, Aim
in which a number of the members, cash flow
changes of successive periods, are positive,
others are negative, and yet others = 0. The
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consultant must find a numeral indicating the
consumption increase possible with this series
of cash flow changes in a goal period t. The
mode of conversion, i.e. the form of the calcula-
tion, is determined by the intercorrelations of
the series of cash flow changes A I and the goal
variable A Ct.
What was said in Chapter 33 can be repeated
with additional precision. A positive cash flow
change A It is spent either to increase con-
sumption during the same period or to obtain
cash flow changes in other periods. The latter
is possible
— by keeping the money in cash for later
consumption,
— by lending the money or reducing existing
debts, or
— by investing the money in other income-
yielding financial or real property.
Accordingly, a negative cash flow change
must be financed either by reducing con-
sumption during the same period, or
— by drawing on existing cash savings,
— by liquidating other existing property, or
— by borrowing.
The last three items imply a postponement
of the negative cash flow changes to later
periods. The alterations a cash flow change
ultimately produces in the payments and con-
sumption of the different periods depends,
therefore, on the individual's decisions in
spending and financing. In other words, the
relationships between A I and A Ct are
conditional.
If a consultant wishes to do the job, he must
either know how the decision maker is going
to proceed in the different cases, or make as-
sumptions which he presents explicitly as a
condition for the final result of the calculation.
For the latter method to meet its purpose, i.e.
to lead to information serviceable for the
decision maker, the assumptions should not
essentially differ from reality.
In the present case the first problem to be
solved is the consumption of the other periods.
To give an example, a forest owner-decision
maker who wishes to buy a car after three
years will increase the spending on his con-
sumption during that period by an amount
equalling the price of the car or the down
pyament. Does the consumption increase in
this one period implicitly involve the aspira-
tion that consumption in other periods must
not change or in any case must not diminish?
Or is the consultant expected to calculate how
much the consumption should be reduced in
other periods to achieve the desired change in
the consumption of the given period? Both
are possible and closely connected with the
financial facilities of the decision maker. In
the former case, investment is financed by
»capital» alone, the investor's own or borrowed,
and in the latter case by »income» (i.e. by
reducing consumption) or »income» plus »capi-
tal» (cf. SAARIO 1965, p. 21; V. KELTIKANGAS
1965, p. 465).
A definite answer to these questions can be
given only by the decision maker himself. It
may be concluded from the above, however,
that the former alternative (increased con-
sumption in one period and unreduced con,
sumption in the other periods) is possible only
for a person who has adequate liquid assets
and/or credit compared with the total cash
flow changes to be financed.
The decision maker's possibilities of finan-
cing and investing also have a decisive effect
on the conversion of cash flow changes. To
illustrate this, let us assume that the series of
cash flow changes consists of only three
changes, the negative A Ii, and the positive
A I2 and A I4. The goal is consumption change
A C3, which in this case contains the expecta-
tion that the consumption changes in periods
other than the third are 0. All periods are
supposed to be 12 months. The series of cash
flow changes
— A Ii, +A I2, 0, +A I4
should therefore be converted into the form
0, 0, ZII3*, 0
where A I3*, all spent on consumption, cor-
responds to A C3*.
The change - A Ii can in this case perhaps
be financed by a loan of equal amount, to be
repaid from the positive cash flow changes of
the later periods 2 and 4. On the other hand, if
the decision maker has bank deposits or other
liquid assets he may use them to finance this
change. The expected cash receipts for the
deposit (or other assets) in later periods will
not flow in, and some of the cash flow changes
of periods 2 and 4 are tied down to finance the
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cash flow components obtained to replace
them.
Of these two ways of financing - A Ii, the
decision maker will presumably give priority
to that one which leaves more of A I2 and A I4
disengaged or free to be spent on consumption,
that is to say, where the cost is lower. The cost
of financing, in addition to the customary
rate of interest, includes also other special out-
lays connected with borrowing or liquidation
of assets. The work involved, and the con-
venience or inconvenience of the transactions,
probably also affect the result of the choice.
Accordingly, that part of the two positive
cash flow changes {A I2 and A I4) not tied
down in the financial arrangements must be
converted into a cash flow change of period 3.
For the former it means an advance in time,
feasible by saving cash money, by depositing
the money in the bank, or by investing it in
some other object, from which it can be with-
drawn at the desired time. The latter cash
flow change (A I4) must be moved back in
time. This is possible, for example, if the
decision maker takes a loan in period 3, re-
paying it with the balance of A I4. Or he may
liquidate some of his assets in period 3; the
expected positive cash flow changes are re-
placed by the new assets obtained with the
same balance of A I4. The choice is again
decided by the result expected from each
alternative procedure, the cost of the trans-
action, and the trouble involved.
Investment calculation in this case can be
built, for example, as following:
The table presents a series of cash flow
changes with a financing and spending plan.
For this plan — explicitly presented to the
decision maker — to be accepted it must pre-
sumably meet a primary requirement briefly
indicated above: the calculation must not
contain such assumptions essentially affecting
the result as are unrealistic from the point of
view of the decision maker's individual finan-
cing and investment chances.
There are normally definite limits to the
amount of money the decision maker can
borrow. By most lenders the borrower is
required to have a certain amount of equity
capital or, alternatively, sufficiently solvent
securities. Equity capital and environmental
credit therefore set a more or less definite
ceiling limit for everybody's borrowing capac-
ity. If the decision maker has already ex-
hausted his chances of borrowing, it is unrea-
listic to include a loan in the financing plan.
Viewpoints connected with the interest and
term of the loan are just as essential. Money
has no uniform »price». The rates of interest
vary depending on the amount of the loan,
the type of security (the borrower's overall
chances of being granted a loan, and the
degree to which they have been utilized),the
term of the loan, and the form of its repay-
ment (see e.g. FISHER 1930, pp. 206—207;
HiRSHLEiFER 1958; HONKO 1963, Chapter 6).
In actual fact, an individual's borrowing
capacity is the function of the rate of interest
payable: the closer the ceiling limit, the higher
the rate payable for every additional loan
(cf. JORGENSEN 1967). Moreover, interest is
payable annually if not more frequently.
Adding the interest to the capital is not
customary, nor is it legally permissible e.g. in
Finland. Regular reductions are also among
the usual terms for loans of a certain type.
Most of these statements are inversely true
of lending. The rates of interest in the sample
calculation, i, V and i" may all be different.
Replacing them with one and the same rate
would be an approximation, and the larger
the differences between the rates of interest,
Series of cash flow changes
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and above all, the longer the time intervals to
which they are applied, the greater would be
tis relative importance to the end result of the
calculation.
Purchase and liquidation of other property
is also associated with a number of restrictions
and characteristics which, if overlooked in the
calculation, may make the result irrelevant
for decision maker. Objects of business trans-
actions, or investments can usually not be
divided arbitrarily into small parts; as a rule,
they are relatively large entities of units, such
as a car or a forest tractor. The cash flow
changes occasioned by them are therefore
»high-stepped» compared with the loan. Ex-
change of ownership rights involves many
expenses (such as the registration of a car or
taking out the title deeds for real estate) which
borrowing of money does not. Receipts from
investments also vary a great deal.
On the basis of the foregoing it is obvious
that drawing up a relevant calculation requires
very detailed knowledge of the decision maker's
facilities and the situation. A calculation based
on assumptions of a general nature (e.g.
uniform rate of interest and unlimited avail-
ability of credit) may be acceptable in certain
cases, whereas in others it produces informa-
tion that misleads the decision maker. In such
a case, it is definitely better if the consultant
does not transform and condense the series of
cash flow changes.
In the above case the decision maker desired
a change in the consumption of one period
while consumption of other periods was to
remain unchanged. The same findings and
conclusions, however, can be generalized to
apply to the other alternatives of the goal set
outlined above.
If the decision maker permits the consump-
tion of other periods to decrease when neces-
sary and plans to finance the transaction,
either wholly or partly, by reducing the con-
sumption of the next few periods to come, the
number of the possible financing and spending
plans will increase. Planning will involve more
degrees of freedom, and the possible forms of
solution in the sample calculation, in addition
to (0, 0, + , 0), are (—, 0, + , 0), (—, —, + , 0),
and (0,—, + ,0) .
The same is true of the cases in which the
decision maker divides the goal of consump-
tion increase over more than one period. If
these goals are no precise amounts of money,
the number of possible solutions is almost
infinite. Using the cash flow change converting
methods described — or just the loan market
— the original series of cash flow changes can
be modified, in principle, into innumerable
variations. Only by fixed goals can the set of
possible alternatives be reduced. The more
numerous the free goals permitted, the more
numerous degrees of freedom in the planning,
and the more markedly subjective the char-
acter of the resulting investment calculation.
This chapter can perhaps be summarized as
follows:
1. / / the forest owner-decision maker has goals
related to change of consumption, the invest-
ment calculation must contain a plan of how
to finance and use the cash flow changes.
2. It is usually possible to work out several
plans leading to the goal. The acceptability
of the calculation presented to the decision
maker is decided by whether the suggested
measures are sufficiently realistic.
3. For the calculation to be relevant, the con-
sultant must know the decision maker's
possibilities of financing and using the cash
flow changes and respect them.
4. If the consultant does not know the decision
maker's possibilities, it may be better not
to transform and condense the series of cash
flow changes than to base the calculation
on assumptions of a general nature.
342. Change in assets as goal of investment
It was indicated above that property viewed
as a goal is not unambiguous, and that the
concept should be precisely defined. It is use-
ful to start the study from the possible
reasons which may prompt the forest owner-
decision maker to strive after property or
assets and increase in assets. The term change
does also cover reduction of property and its
qualitative changes, but they will be dis-
regarded here since a desire to reduce property
is apparently rare, and a qualitative exchange
of assets is usually already eliminated when
the decision falls on investment.
The possible factors leading to increase in
assets may be divided into two main cate-
gories: the forest owner may desire it either
looking forward to the cash flow changes the
property will yield in later periods, or in order
to obtain the power, status, security, joy of
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ownership, etc., brought about by property,
and values that are extremely difficult to
measure and verify (cf. p. 39).
The situation under the alternative »looking
forward to cash flow changes» is usually the
following. The decision maker knows from
experience that certain assets, such as bank
deposits, yield regular and approximately
uniform (positive) cash flow components with
a known ratio to the property, usually its value
(such as interest on deposits). An increase in
this type of assets means in every later period
a set increase of money available for con-
sumption. The relationship is fixed and the
increase in asset passes for a criterion, which
often replaces the separate goals of changes in
consumption during several periods.
It may be concluded from the foregoing
that this replacement is probable only in
cases in which the property may be expected
to yield approximately equal cash flow com-
ponents and in which, on the other hand, the
decision maker desires equal consumption
changes in all periods under review (cf.
preceding chapter). The less uniform the time
distribution of income from property, the
more loosely does property increase reflect
the change in consumption facilities, and the
more poorly does the criterion indicate what
it was assumed to indicate.
But if the motive is authority, status,
security or some other more direct effects of
ownership, the information value of increase
in assets is even more dependent on the
relevant individual and case.
The individual's status and the esteem he
enjoys have been shown to be determined,
among other things, by property and income
(ESKOLA 1964). Property may comprise only
the visible real property or also the com-
ponents more or less invisible to outsiders,
such as money, various receivables, securities,
and so on, and the taxation value may be an
important, if not the most important com-
ponent factor.
Real property is here understood to com-
prise, in addition to the »income-yielding»
components, all the various consumer durables
the individual has: residential housing, motor
cars, household machines, etc. Since the
purchase of consumer durables above was
interpreted as consumption, it may be as-
sumed that at least in certain income brackets
a considerable part, if not all, of the increase in
social esteem is connected with the indi-
vidual's consumption.
Economic power, on the other hand, may be
more closely correlated with financial assets
than real property. Motives of this type are
probably more common in the topmost in-
come brackets.
These examples may suffice to prove that
property increase in different contexts may
refer to different things. The decision maker's
goal may be to increase real property or
financial assets or both, he may be concerned
with the quantity or value of his assets or the
gross increase in assets may be more relevant
than the net increase, and so on. In the fol-
lowing, only the increase in the (total) value of
assets and its derivation from a series of cash
flow changes will be discussed. It may be use-
ful to state here that this characteristic is not
a criterion valid in all cases in which the
decision maker indicates his desire for a
change in assets.
Even the term total value does not make the
goal unambiguous. Value has several inter-
pretations in economics (see e.g. AHONEN
1970, pp. 10—14). The two customary inter-
pretations which will be discussed here, and
which are distinctly different from one an-
other, are the utilization value and the exchange
value.
The exchange value of an asset (say, a
building) is the price paid on sale or purchase.
The exchange value of assets is the monetary
sales income obtained when all property is
sold.
If the owner, instead of selling, uses the
asset (the house) for his own purposes, he may
expect to obtain some net receipts and other
positively or negatively experienced effects.
When the owner defines the amount of money
which (at the moment of evaluation) is worth
the net receipts and other consequences he
obtains from the asset by utilizing it himself,
he indicates its utilization value.
The utilization value of property is de-
cisively determined by the purpose for which
the owner intends to use it and his evaluation
of the consequences of the use. In other words,
the utilization value is subjective. The ex-
change values are arrived at by mutual agree-
ments between different individuals, buyers
and sellers. The underlying basis is, however,
the buyers' and sellers' idea of the utilization
value of the asset bought or sold. For forest
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property, the value concepts and value forma-
tion process have been described in detail by
the present author in an earlier paper (M. KEL-
TIKANGAS 1964). Cf. also AHONEN 1970,
pp. 10—17.
If the motive for desiring change in the value
of assets is to obtain prestige, status or general
esteem and appreciation by outsiders this,
most naturally, is represented by the exchange
value, the value that is apparent to any out-
sider. Utilization value is a subjective and
individual valuation, and a change in it might
better correspond to the decision maker's
ideas if the background motive is e.g. the pure
»joy of ownership». Both value concepts are
possible, even though the exchange value is
probably the one the decision maker mostly
has in mind. In the following, the relationship
of the series of cash flow changes to both these
values will be discussed.
The ownership of the object of valuation —
whether classified under real or financial
property — means a right of ownership to (and
liability for) the receipts and outlays con-
nected with the object immediately or later,
and/or other, intangible effects. Disregarding
the latter, it may be said that the owner who
places a high value on the object in actual fact
sets store by the income, or the series of cash
flow changes obtainable (cf. FISHER 1930,
pp. 12—15). The property increase occasioned
by investment equals the difference between
the values of the cash flows.
Assuming further that the value of the
series is the sum of the values of its individual
members — not a self-evident yet generally
used simplification — the effect of the series
of cash flow changes on the value of property
can be measured by the present value of the
series of cash flow ohanges, illustrated in a
general form by the following equation:
(5) Vo == A Io + ai A
1
•A
at A It
am A Im
Coefficients at indicate the valuation ratio or
time preference which, seen from the subject's
point of view, prevails between cash flow
changed It and the corresponding valuation
change, i.e. present cash flow change. The
selection of these coefficients is the crucial
problem in value determination.
It is customary to relate each coefficient to
time. If the measuring unit is one year (a pure
convention in itself), we can write
(6) at - ( 1 H- i*)- *
Equation (5) above will then acquire the form
(7) Vo - A I« + (1 + ii)-1 A Ii + . . .
+ (1 + im)-m A Im
and we will have to choose the interest rate it
which is to be applied in the discounting, or
present value determination, of each income
change A It.
If it is assumed that ii = is = . . . = = im,
the equation can be further condensed into
the form
(8) Vo = A Io + (1 + i)-1 A h + , . .
+ (1 + i)-» A Im
m
(8a) = V (1 + l ) - t j It
t = o
which is the familiar basic formula for the
present value of investment (cf. HIRSHLEIFER
1958, p. 345).
In this formula, the transformation and
condensation of information (series of cash
flow changes) is carried through in its com-
plete form: each individual element of in-
formation (cash flow change) is transformed
into its present value, after which the series of
transformed elements (present values of cash
flow changes) is condensed into a single
number (present value of total investment).
To estimate the serviceability of the
method, attention must be devoted to the two
assumptions leading up to the formula:
1. The value of the series of cash flow changes
was assumed to equal the sum of the values
of individual cash flow changes.
2. The rates of interest used to discount the
individual cash flow changes were assumed
to be equal, i.e. independent of the distance
in time.
What are the conditions in which these as-
sumptions may be expected to be valid?
In his perception of the utilization value,
the individual may think of the consumption
the object will ultimately make possible. The
present value indicates the value which the
individual at the moment of valuation at-
taches to the items of consumption into which
he intends to convert the future cash flow
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change. This assumption is the focal point
both for FISHER (1930) and the authors who
have developed and applied his theory (for
example, HIRSHLEIFER I.e., p. 330; FLORA
1966; HALLSTEN 1966, pp. 20—24; cf. M. KEL-
TIKANGAS 1969).
In the studies mentioned, a uniform rate of
interest is considered an exception rather than
the rule. To determine the present value,
therefore, it is usually necessary to know the
individual's subjective time preferences and
his possibilities of shifting the cash flow
changes by borrowing, lending or investing
(cf. HIRSHLEIFER I.e., p. 350; FLORA I.e., pp. 22
and 51—53). It is therefore necessary to
determine the at's and it's separately for each
cash flow change.
In another context the present writer
condensed the conclusions concerning pre-
requisites of the discounting procedure into
the following form: »One must assume
straight-lined time indifference maps to ful-
fill the requirement of independence of the
size (of income), and a common, universal
possibility of lending, investing and borrowing
unlimitedly at the same rate of interest to
achieve independence of the person. If, in
reality, there are »mixed form» (i.e. partly
curvilinear) time indifference maps, it is quite
possible, and even probable, that i will have
different values not only for different persons
and different sizes of income but also for
different lengths of /.» (M. KELTIKANGAS
1969, p. 89.)
Should the calculation situation not meet
the said conditions, the solution, or the deter-
mination of present value, ultimately depends
on the decision maker personally. On the other
hand, if the decision maker has set consump-
tion goals for his activity he has, in a way,
already solved the problem: the consumption
goals of the different periods may be con-
sidered to indicate the decision maker's ideas
of the mutual value, or exchangeability, of
these goals. It would therefore not seem
necessary to ascertain a separate present value
based on consumption.
In determining the present value of invest-
ment the decision maker, however, may re-
place consumption by cash flow changes as
such, their saving and re-investment. The rate
of interest must then be considered to depend
solely on the financing and investment pos-
sibilities, without being affected by consump-
tion-based time preference. Where the goal is
a change in the value of assets, associated with
goals of simultaneous consumption change,
this interpretation of present value may ap-
parently be considered more realistic than the
former.
The rates of interest in lending and borrow-
ing, and even more the rates of return for
investments, however, are not independent of
time. For loans of different terms, interest is
generally required and paid according to dif-
ferent rates, and investments of different
durations yield different returns. Here, too,
the possible uses of the discount formula
depend essentially on the decision maker's
subjective calculation situation. The error
possibly arising from the use of a simplifying
assumption, however, is of smaller relative
importance in cases in which cash flow changes
are not discounted over long periods, than in
the determination of the present value of more
distant net receipts.
The ratio between cash flow changes and
exchange value is more difficult to determine.
If the exchange value is understood as the
equilibrium price on the market for the object
concerned, its amount is governed by the sub-
jective utilization value considerations of
several different individuals. The object of
purchase and sale, even in this case, is a series
of cash flow changes, but it may seem different
to different persons. In the determination of
present value, one may imagine that each cash
flow change is bought and sold separately (cf.
AHONEN 1970, p. 30). If so, however, each at
and it must be selected separately, one price
based on the supply and demand of close-range
cash flow changes, and another price similarly
for distant cash flow changes. In reality, how-
ever, there are no such markets, and no such
supply and demand prices, for the object of
sales and purchases usually is a series of cash
flow changes. (It should be recalled, moreover,
that the price formation of a property object
is governed also by effects other than mone-
tary.) No objectively determinable ratio of
cash flow changes and exchange value, in-
dependent of individuals on the market, can
therefore be given. If the consultant wishes to
determine the property value change as a
change in market value, he must find some
other means than the series of cash flow
changes to help him (cf. AHONEN I.e., pp. 11
and 66).
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On the basis of the above it may be sum-
marized that if the consultant wishes to trans-
form and condense the series of cash flow
changes into a criterion indicating the change in
the value of assets, this word having the mean-
ings given above, a perfectly objective method is
hard to find. The decision maker may conceive
the value change in many different ways, and
none of these seems to have a relationship to
cash flow changes independent of person.
If the consultant uses the present value as
an approximate method, the interest rates
used to convert individual cash flow com-
ponents should be selected so as to correspond
to the decision maker's respective value con-
cepts and relevant chances of shifting cash
flow components.
All these conclusions were concerned with
the transformation and condensation of a
series of cash flow changes to present value.
The forest owner-decision maker does not,
however, necessarily time his goal in changing
the value of assets always to present time or to
the first period. It is equally possible that he
desires a certain increase in value by some
more distant period, and during the course of
several periods. The conclusions drawn above
are applicable also to these cases.
343. Change in liquidity as goal of invest-
ment
The liquidity of an enterprise usually refers,
in terms of business economics, to the capacity
of the enterprise to pay its current expenses
and if necessary, its short-term debts (cf.
HONKO 1963, p. 88). The concept can be
applied as such also to the economic unit of
the present study. An individual's liquidity
refers to the individual's ability at a given date
to settle the payments required for consumption
and other activities, and interest and reduction
of debts — including, if necessary, immediate
repayment of a recalled loan.
The ability to look after one's liabilities
punctually presupposes that there is money
in cash when required, or that money can be
quickly obtained. The decision maker's liqui-
dity is composed of two factors: the correct
timing of receipts and outlays, and quick
convertibility of property into cash.
The above can be put as follows: the finan-
cial means must be available for every plan-
ned change in consumption. In this meaning,
liquidity is a principle rather than a quantita-
tively measurable goal. It is realized if invest-
ment calculation is worked out as suggested in
Chapter 341 in the form of a plan of how to
finance and use cash flow changes.
The liquidity requirement in a stricter form
may demand the ability to finance all, or a
fixed minimum share, of the consumption
changes by the positive cash flow changes the
investment produces at the same point of
time. A requirement or goal of this type can be
taken into account in the drafted financing
plan by imposing limitations on the decision
maker's chances of raising loans.
Improved or weakened convertibility of
assets into cash can also apparently be inter-
preted in two ways: either it refers to the
extent to which the timing of receipts from
property can be modified, or to the possibility
of selling a part of the assets. The former is
associated with the number of conditional
relationships; the more frequently and the
faster the decision maker can modify his plan
concerning the use of the object of property
and, consequently, the expected series of cash
flow changes, i.e. the more closely the expecta-
tions depend on the decision maker's later
decisions, the more liquid the object of
investment. Liquidity understood in this way
is hard to combine with any quantitative
criterion which could be derived from the
series of cash flow changes itself.
But if the saleability of the assets is under
consideration, and this is probably the most
common interpretation, the question of the
exchange value of property must be recon-
sidered (see preceding chapter). The object
may be sold in toto or in parts, and in both
cases the immediate sales possibilities and the
price fetched depend on external market fac-
tors. Neither of them can be directly derived
from the series of cash flow changes. Other
routes and calculations must be used to show
them.
344. Uncertainty involved in the time fac-
tor, and how to consider it in invest-
ment calculation
Reference has been made above in many
contexts, though only passingly, to a factor
which in practical decision making and in
investment calculations probably raises the
most and the hardest problems (cf. HEADY
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1952, p. 439): the diverse uncertainty of the
decision situation.
As mentioned in Chapter 31, investment is
succeeded by a number of changes in the state
of the decision maker's environment. If the
action itself is indicated by A and the changes
in state by B, it may be said ex post facto that
A was succeeded by B and that there were
intervening relationships A -*• Bi. In advance,
ex ante, this is however not known. The
decision maker (or consultant) may only form
expectations concerning the changes in state
that A is likely to produce.
These expectations are not born out of
nothing. The individual bases them on what
he knows about the subject from earlier ex-
perience, from information received or ob-
tained from others, and from his own thinking.
Experience and information may be connected
with similar earlier events or events so close to
them that analogous conclusions are possible.
The quantity and quality of the information
available, together with the decision maker's
personal character, decide how certain or un-
certain the decision maker's idea of these
relationships shall be.
This »subjective» uncertainty of idea or
opinion which is a result of the decision
maker's lack of earlier experience and in-
formation, is almost inseparably associated
with the »objective» uncertainty of the rela-
tionships. Few relationships are firm and
deterministic. The majority are probably con-
ditional in that A is succeeded by Bi, provided
a number of other environmental variables are
simultaneously in a given state. When these
variables are allowed to vary, i.e. to obtain
different values, the relationship A -> Bi will
also vary. It follows that the larger the number
of uncontrolled variables, i.e. variables for
which no value at all or only a wide range of
variation can be determined, the larger is the
number of values possible in A -> Bj rela-
tionship. Since all variables can hardly ever
be controlled, the relationships with which
the consultant operates are mostly mean
values or »typical» values from a random set of
variables with wider or narrower range.
When such a mean value, i.e. a typical or
probable value, determined from earlier ex-
perience, is serving as the basis of calculation,
the result contains an element of uncertainty,
that is to say, an incorrect solution is possible.
Whether, and in which way, the individual
making the decision takes this into account,
depends both on his frame of mind and on the
relative importance and probability of the in-
correct solution. If the potential error in the
cash flow change might, when put into effect,
jeopardize the individual's whole property or
subsistence the uncertainty is probably ex-
perienced as a much more essential factor than
in cases in which the potential loss remains at
a fraction of the individual's total earnings.
It is also obvious that the potential error is
taken much more seriously when its proba-
bility is one to ten (P = 0.1) than when
P = 0.0001.
It follows from the foregoing that un-
certainty of the expected series of cash flow
changes may be a relevant piece of information
for the decision maker. The commission given
to the consultant may be considered to include
the demand that, in connection with his
findings, he must somehow express the degree
of uncertainty.
How to measure the uncertainty of indi-
vidual cash flow changes and how to combine
the data to obtain the desired characteristic
are questions that will not be discussed in the
present paper. It may suffice to mention that
possible criteria (and the decision maker's
goals) recommended for various situations in-
clude e.g. not only the variance of the results
(MARKOWITZ 1959; DOWDLE 1962), range
(BOULDING 1950, p. 118), but also the use of
maximum and minimum values instead of the
most probable value (e.g. LUCE and RAIFFA
1957; MARTY 1964). If the degree of un-
certainty is not a relevant data the calcula-
tions can probably be carried out using the
most probable expectations.
From the point of view of the problem
studied, the connections between uncertainty
and time are most essential. Many authors
seem to agree that the uncertainty of ex-
pectations increases as they extend into the
future and that the increase is faster than
rectilinear (e.g. SHACKLE 1958; FLORA 1966).
A general agreement exists as to its causes:
the further in time the expectations are
extended, the larger the number of variables
affecting the relationship which have time to
change, and the wider becomes the potential
variation range of the said relationship.
The development, however, is not equally
fast and complete for all relationships. Some of
the variables change slowly, and may even be
48
considered practically constant. These are e.g.
many factors governed by the laws of nature.
Another extreme group of variables consists
of individuals' decisions and the relationships
closely connected to them, which in Chapter
32 were called conditional. Changes in this
group are often neither slight nor gradual, and
may produce considerable changes in environ-
mental states.
An additional factor is the uncertain de-
lineation of the elements and relationships to
be considered relevant in the decision maker's
environment (cf. Chapter 31). The more
distant the future involved, the more probable
it is that many factors now disregarded by the
decision maker as irrelevant will become
relevant. In other words, the sphere of ele-
ments and relationships in the environment is
widened and its composition changes with
time. Since the decision maker's ability, as
often pointed out above, of recognizing
simultaneous relationships is very limited and
the individual's idea of his environment even
at the present moment is restricted (cf. Chap-
ter 31), he has no chance of widening his model
of thinking by continuously adding new vari-
ables as they become relevant. Hence the
element-relationship networks recognized by
the decision maker in the course of time begin
to represent an ever diminishing part of the
total set of variables which may decisively
affect not only the goal variables but also the
elements and relationships recognized by the
decision maker.
This restriction of his field of vision also
means that the decision maker becomes in-
creasingly uncertain of the validity of his ex-
pectations. Information available to him —
including that evolved by inferences — be-
comes the less complete the more distant the
future period in question. In this way the
chances of forming a definite opinion, e.g.
concerning the range of a given relationship,
gradually disappear. SHACKLE (1965, p. 89)
expresses the same thing by saying that
»illumination of the future by the present fades
gradually, however rapidly», and that »there
is a thickening mist».
In a given phase, which may vary depending
on the individual concerned, this uncertainty
— it might also be termed lack of knowledge
— reaches a threshold after which the decision
maker is unable or unwilling to form ex-
pectations. This »point» has usually been
termed the time horizon or just horizon (e.g.
SHACKLE 1958, p. 83; 1961, p. 223; M. KELTI-
KANGAS 1969). HEADY (1952, p. 474) and
FLORA (1966) are among those using the term
planning horizon.
The time horizon is the time limit beyond
which the decision maker perceives no precise
expectations of his environmental conditions.
It also limits the formulation of the decision
maker's goals, provided they are interpreted
as in the present study, as changes the decision
maker desires in the expected states of his
environment (cf. Chapter 31). Relevant goals
appear only within the time horizon.
The above does not mean that it is possible
to determine a fixed time limit to which the
forest owner-decision maker's formulation of
expectations extends and beyond which the
future is in no way imaginable. The fact is,
rather, that the distance of this time horizon
varies both according to person and according
to situation. If observations concerning the
planning by enterprises and communities can
be generalized to portray the thinking of indi-
viduals, they seem to indicate that the more
general, i.e. the more slowly changing, the
object variables are, the longer will be the
period of time during which plans and ex-
pectations can be formulated (cf. e.g. HONKO
1963, pp. 134—135; PITKÄNEN 1969, p. 33).
Planning of details seldom extends beyond
one or two years, that of general lines of
activity may cover 5—10 years, whereas any
planning extending beyond 10 years is only
approximate forecasting of the future devel-
opments.
MCKEAN'S explanation of the origin of the
time horizon is also worth quoting: »Beyond
some date, the gain from preparing hazy
estimates is less than the cost» (MCKEAN
1958, p. 75).
The role of these statements for the fo-
rest owner-decision maker's goals, according
to the above, may now be estimated as
follows:
1. One of the first steps in drafting an invest-
ment calculation is to fix the time horizon
relevant to the situation concerned.
2. The decision maker is likely to perceive
consumption change goals for only a limited
number of periods (cf. Chapter 31). The
time limit is fixed by the relevant time
horizon, beyond which cash flow changes are
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of no value for the decision maker's con-
sumption unless, by financial arrangements,
they can be converted into cash flow and
consumption changes within the time hori-
zon. In such a case, however, absence or
uncertainty of expectations applies equally
to the decision maker's borrowing and
investment chances beyond the time hori-
zon.
3. According to the model applied, the goals
concerned with change in value of assets
must also fall within the time horizon. The
following rule is valid: a change in properly
value at the time horizon is determined as
exchange value, since absence of expectations
makes any utilization value based on cash
flow changes beyond the horizon conceptually
impossible.
4. CERTAIN CARDINAL PROBLEMS IN PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
The theory, which was formulated above
concerning the investment calculation by a
consultant assisting the forest owner-decision
maker, and the inclusion of the time factor in
such calculations, can now be reduced into the
following form.
1. An investment calculation, according to
the model of decision making process used as
the frame of reference, is primarily a calcu-
lation transforming and condensing informa-
tion. Information composed of the directly
expected effects of investment is, as far as
possible, transformed and condensed in the
investment calculation into one or more
criteria by means of which the forest owner
can conclude, more easily than from the
original information, whether the studied in-
vestment alternative fulfils the goals set.
2. The decision maker expects, in the first
place, that the consultant will continue the
transformation and condensation of informa-
tion only as far as factual knowledge permits,
and will leave to the decision maker all solu-
tions concerning value judgements. If the
information available does not permit the in-
formation to be condensed into a single
criterion the consultant cannot avoid pre-
senting the decision maker with a set of
criteria containing perhaps several elements.
From the decision maker's point of view, this
is preferable to complete condensation into a
single criterion on the basis of conventional
assumptions, perhaps leading to loss of rele-
vant information (cf. JOHNSEN 1968, p. 468).
3. The information to be transformed and
condensed in an investment calculation is
composed of changes resulting from invest-
ment in the forest owner-decision maker's ex-
pected cash receipts and cash outlays, or cash
flows. Such an investment calculation must be
understood as a partial calculation. It ex-
cludes all those investment effects relevant to
the decision making which cannot be ex-
pressed in terms of cash flow changes. (Con-
version of physical events into cash flow
changes is here interpreted as a preliminary
phase of investment calculation).
4. The form and structure of the calcula-
tion are determined, case by case, by the forest
owner-decision maker's goal setting.
5. If the decision maker's goals are changes
in consumption, in other words, if he desires a
change in his income available for consump-
tion at one or more given dates or periods, the
investment calculation must contain a plan of
how to finance and utilize the cash flow
changes. Otherwise the information obtained
from the calculation is not what the decision
maker needs and is searching for.
6. If the goal is a change in the value of
assets, customarily termed profit, the present
value of the investment can, with certain
reservations, be used as its criterion. The
present value must be calculated on the basis
of an interest rate concurring with the realistic
chances of financing and investment in each
case.
7. If the decision maker desires simulta-
neous changes in consumption and assets, the
calculations must be carried out by both of
the above two methods.
8. Time preference is associated with
changes of consumption, i.e. their mutual time
valuations. If the above procedure is followed,
the decision maker's time preference is evident
from his goal setting. In this case, it will be
unnecessary to combine time preference and
selection of discount rate. (Gf. the remark by
FLORA, 1966, p. 51:». . . in order for persons to
rank competing investment opportunities, it
is not a necessary assumption that future
costs and returns are discounted to a base
year; rather, they can be evaluated in terms
of the highest-ranking discount locus which
each activity can achieve».)
9. Only those investment effects are in-
cluded in the calculations which in each case
remain within a relevant time horizon. For ex-
ample, in determining the present value,
calculations may consider a sales income (or
its change) obtainable from property or an
investment object but not the cash flow
changes beyond the horizon, or the utilization
value of an investment object at the horizon
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based on them. If the consultant is ignorant of
the precise distance of the time horizon, he
can work out his calculation so that it ex-
presses the result as a function of the dist-
ance of time horizon.
10. These procedural rules make up the
framework within which the investment calcu-
lation should be held. Leaving this framework
means that the calculation and the validity of
its results are weakened. When the possibilities
of simplifying additional assumptions are de-
liberated — for example, the use of one, uni-
form interest rate although the true rates of
the different periods may vary to some extent
— the loss of validity must be studied sepa-
rately in each case. Care must be taken not to
exceed the decision maker's tolerance limit on
this point. Since situations are different it is
hardly possible to find a general rule ap-
plicable to all cases.
The above conclusions concerning the
structure of investment calculation are not
totally new. Similar ideas — perhaps dif-
ferently expressed and often accociated with
other type of problems — have been pro-
pounded by several earlier authors (cf. e.g.
SAARI 1942; HONKO 1955, 1963; MCKEAN
1958; HERMANSEN 1964). A difference, in the
present writer's opinion, is first and foremost
the approach, viz. the interpreting of an invest-
ment calculation as transformation and conden-
sation of information, continued no further than
is objectively possible in each case on the basis
of available data. The more or less sporadic
viewpoints which have usually been presen-
ted as limiting reservations under traditio-
nal methods, have in this way been includ-
ed as essential components of the theory
itself.
The evolved theory differs from the tradi-
tional concepts of forestry mentioned in the
introduction, in that it is more extensive. In a
way traditional present value calculations
may be considered a special case under the
investment calculation now presented.
The theory is general in so far as generality
was foreseen in the definition of the study
purpose. It applies to all those investment
calculations the consultant may have to make
while assisting a farmer-consumer who, among
his other possessions, owns and controls a
forest unit. The question as to the extent to
which the viewpoints presented are applicable
to other types of economic units, will be dis-
cussed by the present writer in another
context.
Although the theory has been evolved
especially with a view to investments in timber
growing and consequently is a theory of invest-
ment calculations in timber growing, the prac-
tical applications are accompanied by special
problems, passingly referred to above, which
vary to some extent according to the case and
the situation to which calculation applies.
The majority of these problems are most
suitably discussed in connection with various
application studies. Some of the most sub-
stantial, however, deserve a brief mention
here.
Forest improvements
As indicated in the introduction, the ulti-
mate stimulus to this investigation was
provided by the problem of the profitability
sequence of forest improvements. Hence, the
following discussion of the problems connected
with the application of the theory approaches
them from the angle of forest improvements.
For this reason it may be useful to define in
some detail the relationship between timber
growing and forest improvements.
Timber growing is here used as a general
name for all attempts to influence the develop-
ment of the growing stock in a stand or forest,
that is to say, its increment, volume, and/or
quality. The most customary of these steps
can be roughly classified as follows (cf. JOR-
GENSEN 1964b; EINOLA 1964; STREYFFERT
1965):
— thinning and final cuttings
— regeneration
— forest improvements proper, i.e. steps to
improve the growth capacity or the quality
of forest, such as forest drainage, fertili-
zation, cleaning and thinning of seedling
stand, pruning, etc.
— expansion of forest property by purchases
or its reduction by sale,
— supplementary investments in administra-
tion of forest unit, buildings, machines, etc.
Thinning and final cuttings are those that
most directly affect the revenue. When he
decides whether or not to cut his forest the
forest owner decides when, and in what
amounts, he wishes to take the cutting income
from his forest. Postponement of cutting is
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not only a change in timing, but usually also a
quantitative change in the volume of timber
accrued and/or the amount of income obtain-
ed, for the forest grows and timber prices
fluctuate. Especially in thinning cuttings the
effects of the decision may be projected onto
the timing and amount of later cutting in-
comes.
Regeneration is intended to ensure the
growth of new forest after a final cutting. If
natural regeneration is desired the steps are
started years before the final cutting. Apart
from preparation of the soil surface, they
depend on the timing and type of final
cuttings. But if forest is artificially regenerated
the real work is timed for the years following
the final cutting. It comprises preparation of
the soil surface and planting or seeding. In all
cases it may be necessary to protect the
development of seedlings in the early years
and to ensure the regeneration of forest by
various later steps, such as the removal of
weeds and brushes.
Forest regeneration by seeding and planting
differs from afforestation, classified under
forest improvements proper, primarily in that
there is no final cutting to precede afforesta-
tion. The same independence of the decision to
cut the existing stand is also a characteristic of
the other steps of this category. In other
words, a stand may be fertilized, a seedling
stand thinned, a swamp drained, a birch stand
pruned, and so on, without preceding cuttings
in the stand to be treated.
These are the three categories of silvicultural
steps usually called to mind when investments
in timber growing are discussed. Forest sales
and purchases are less frequent, and are invest-
ments of an entirely different magnitude. In
principle, however, quantitative changes in
forest property also mean changes in the ex-
pected cash flows in the same way as the
qualitative changes in a forest.
Supplementary investments cover e.g. having
a forestry plan made for the forest unit,
lodgings provided for workers, and the con-
struction of forest truck roads. They differ
from all the foregoing in that their influence on
timber growing is indirect. In many cases it is
difficult to ascribe a supplementary invest-
ment to timber growing alone, for it may
serve, say, timber harvesting and agriculture
at the same time.
In the following, forest improvements will
refer primarily to the steps classified above
under forest improvements proper, and to such
regeneration of forest in which a »reduced-yield»
stand is treated (cf. SAARI 1968, concerning the
term »reduced yield»).
According to the earlier definition of invest-
ment, only a part of the listed timber growing
steps and forest improvements are invest-
ments in the strict sense of the word. For
example, regeneration of a reduced-yield
spruce stand, on dry mineral land, into a pine
stand is a chain of events starting with a
revenue from cutting and not with an expense
item. As stated in Chapter 21, the evolved
theory can, however, be generalized for all
cases in which cash flow changes need to be
deliberated. In the following, therefore, forest
improvement »investments» and other forest
improvements will not be distinguished.
Defining of output
The introduction emphasized two special
characteristics of timber growing: the very
slow rate at which steps mature into receipts,
and the relative freedom of the forest owner to
time the cuttings to suit himself. These char-
acteristics also affect the definition of forest
improvement output, and they must therefore
be discussed in some detail.
The rotation of a stand, which here refers to
the interval from the establishment of a
seedling stand to the final cutting (cf. e.g.
NYYSSÖNEN 1958, pp. 7—10) is, under Finnish
conditions, at least 70 years. During this
interval, the stand undergoes something like
3—7 thinnings and a final cutting yielding
sales revenue. The first of them is probably
timed for the age of 30—50 years, and the
others recur at 5—15 year intervals. In the
future the cuttings may become even less
frequent (VUOKILA 1969, p. 143).
Let us assume that the forest owner has a
cutting programme for the whole, or a part of
the rotation in his mind when he starts
planning to postpone thinning e.g. by a year.
The decision may only imply the postpone-
ment of the cutting to another date, by which
time increment may have increased the timber
volume to be removed. Or, it may mean
changes in the timing and volumes of later
cuttings as well. In other words, the influence
of the cutting decision is apparent in changes in
the cutting programme.
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The determination of these changes in the
cutting programme is one of the essential
problems of investment calculations for forest
improvements. A cutting programme can be
compiled and defined in many different ways,
and the decisions made in that context sub-
stantially affect the contents of the calculation
itself. The time dimension of the cutting pro-
gramme will be discussed further below, while
the extent of the object system of forest invest-
ments will be discussed here (cf. Chapter 31).
The cutting programme may be understood
simply as the intended succession of cuttings
in a target stand, or as an economic plan
covering the whole forest unit. The former is
suggested mainly by operational factors: in
calculation techniques, it is easier to make
assumptions concerning the treatment of a
single stand. The latter is probably closer to
reality if the total effects of forest improve-
ment on the cash flows of the forest owner are
sought.
The treatment of a stand is usually not
independent of that of the other stands, and
especially the neighbouring stands, in a
forest unit. The selected definition of the
object system may therefore considerably
affect the extent and timing of the effects
(changes in the cutting programme) to be
dealt with in the calculation. This may be
assumed to happen especially when forest im-
provement takes place in a stand or stands
which represent a relatively large proportion
of the whole forest unit (cf. especially SAARI
1942, pp. 28—29; see also LUNDELL 1970).
For a discussion of the extent and timing of
cuttings, it may be useful to define the
concepts of bound and unbound growing stock
(V. KELTIKANGAS 1938, pp. 109—128). The
bound growing stock of a given date refers to
that part of the growing stock in a stand or
forest unit which, under valid statutory
stipulations (in Finland, especially The Pri-
vate Forest Act) or market rulings (minimum
dimensions and quality standards of timber),
must not be cut, or whose cutting serves no
useful purpose. Continuity and other require-
ments set by the forest owner himself may also
be interpreted as factors increasing the degree
to which the growing stock is bound. At each
cutting, the margin of deliberation is restricted
to the part of the stand unbound at that moment;
this part might be termed the liquid growing
stock. When drafting his cutting programme,
the forest owner must restrict his plans as to
whether he will cut or not, only to the growing
stock unbound at the moment in the stand or
forest unit.
The majority of these restrictions of forest
use may be taken to apply to just one stand.
The restriction which perhaps most clearly
would require a viewpoint of a whole forest,
unit, viz. the demand for constant or con-
tinuing cutting volumes from a forest unit, is
not impossed by law on the privately owned
forests in Finland, apart from a few so-called
land settlement farms. If the forest owner, in
his use of forest, observes the principle of
sustained yield (or progressive) forestry, he
does so voluntarily and probably also ac-
cording to his own rules. Consequently, the
forest owner must take part in the determina-
tion of forest improvement output in terms of
changes in the cutting programme or allowable
cut. The determination is subjective.
Besides changes in the cutting programme,
forest improvement may have other effects
which need to be considered per forest unit
and not only per stand. Among these »indirect
benefits» SAARI (1942, p. 9) mentions the im-
proved communications in a forest unit as a
result of forest drainage. To what extent and
in which form they are included in the calcula-
tions also depends on the mutual agreement
between forest owner and consultant. There is
no point in offering general recommendations
in this connection.
This is perhaps sufficient discussion con-
cerning the defining problem. It is of secon-
dary importance for the subject proper of the
study, the inclusion of the time factor, and its
detailed analysis may be postponed to suitable
later studies.
Forest owner's goals
According to the theory presented, the form
of an investment calculation — i.e. the method
of transforming and processing information —
depends decisively on the goals of the forest
owner-decision maker at each moment. These,
in principle, must be cleared up separately
case by case.
When a forest owner undertakes forest im-
provement, hardly anything more can be said
about his goals than about a decision maker's
goals in general. Only empirical studies can
reveal whether regularities appear in forest
54
owners' goal settings e.g. by own groups or age
groups. Until such analyses are available, we
can only assume that all kinds of goals are
possible, and the methods must be evolved
accordingly.
A couple of points may, however, be raised.
The above theory is built on the idea that the
decision making process is created by a gap
between the actual and the desired situation
(between achievements and the decision mak-
er's aspiration levels). The decision maker's
goal in his investment actions is to bridge these
gaps (e.g., diminution of money income avail-
able for consumption) without creating simul-
taneous new gaps in some other goal dimen-
sions (e.g., the volume of construction timber
used on the farm).
These gaps are not always deficits. Ex-
ceeding the aspiration levels may also trigger
off a decision making process. The forest
owner may start deliberating on a forest im-
provement measure for the purpose of in-
creasing his future revenues, but the reason
may also be because he has made money on
cuttings and wishes to invest this money. It is
easier for the consultant to work out a calcula-
tion in the former case since the decision
maker may be expected to have recognized his
goal and can express it more clearly. In the
latter case, however, the consultant may have
to start by defining the goals.
The gaps, and hence the goals, may also be
mainly or totally unconnected with the forest
owner's cash flows. For example, the forest
owner may start draining his swamp because
his neighbours have done so. Or he may weed
his forest in order to win a local or provincial
competition for the best tended forest. If so,
the investment calculation plays no visible
part in decision making. But the consultant is
unlikely to be approached for calculations in a
case of this type.
Time horizon
It was pointed out in the introduction that
many authors have, with justification, doubt-
ed whether the time horizon of a forest owner
of the type discussed in the present study can
extend as far as to the end of a rotation, at any
rate in all cases. It is not known, however, how
distant these forest owners' time horizons are
in reality.
The only empirical study of time horizons
the present writer has seen (FLORA 1966; cf.
Introduction), cannot as such be generalized
to apply to Finnish conditions. The material
collected by FLORA, it is true, derives from a
region where stand rotations do not differ
much from those in Finland. Otherwise, how-
ever, the conditions and framework of forestry
are different. The forest owners interviewed
— five from each of the ten New England
counties drawn by lot — were the region's
greatest private forest owners (mean forest
unit size 1505 ha), and no less than 19 of these
50 owned a sawmill as well.
Some indications of the Finnish forest own-
ers' possible time horizons are provided by the
following, partly sporadic data. LINDGREN
(1968), in his study of the transfer of farms
from one generation of a family to another,
based on material collected in 1959 and re-
presenting the whole of Finland, found that
the heir to a farm had an average age of 34—39
years at the time of inheritance and was, on
average, 67 years old when he gave up the
farm (I.e., p. 45). Such a man, on taking over
his inheritance, has about 30 years of owner-
ship ahead of him. If he has no children or
other close heirs it is difficult to see why, in
planning his activities, he should think beyond
those 30 years of his presumable ownership.
The mean age of farm forest owners in Fin-
land is relatively high, about 50 years ac-
cording to the 1959 Census of Agriculture
(Suomen . . . 1962). If such an »average» forest
owner in his calculations considers only his
own period of ownership, his time horizon is
even shorter than 30 years. But if he has
children to continue his work they may affect
his decisions, and it is possible that the time
horizon will be slightly longer. All exact fig-
ures, however, must be omitted until em-
pirical studies have been conducted on this
point.
These figures provide an overall idea of the
limits within which the time horizons may
move in average cases. But the consultant, in
each calculation situation, must know the time
horizon of the forest owner-decision maker he is
assisting. He can only find this out from the
decision maker himself.
The best techniques for determining the
time horizon may be overlooked in this con-
nection. But the question of how to take into
account a time horizon whose exact length is
not. known deserves attention. It is just this
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situation that arises in studies of the profit-
ability sequence of forest improvements. Cal-
culations cannot be carried out in advance
according to the time horizon of any individual
»average» forest owner.
A serviceable solution might be to carry out
calculations using several different horizons. In
other words, results are calculated for each
forest improvement alternative using time
horizons of, say, 5, 10, 20, 30, . . . years. The
user of the results can then first choose the
relevant time horizon and then the results cor-
responding to this horizon.
If the first positive cash flow change effects
to be expected from a forest improvement will
be far in the future, say after 30—40 years, it
is possible that none of them can be accom-
modated within the decision maker's time
horizon. All the relevant cash flow changes are
then negative. This does not mean that the
calculation is unnecessary or that the forest
owner directly rejects the forest improvement
involved. As pointed out in Chapter 32, forest
improvement may have effects other than
those expressible in terms of money, and if so,
the result of the investment calculation alone
is not decisive. Nevertheless, it may be a
necessary data for the decision maker.
It should be emphasized that the time hori-
zon problem has here been discussed mainly
with a view to Finnish conditions, that is to
say, in forestry with long rotations. Where a
more propitious climate makes essentially
shorter rotations, of 5—15 years, the problems
discussed above possibly lose a great deal of
their importance (cf. SAARI 1967).
Comparison of alternatives
According to the precise definition of the
study problem (see Chapter 25), the develop-
ment of the theory above was restricted to
calculations in which information concerning
the effects of one investment alternative at a
time is transformed and condensed. (In a way,
it may be considered that there are two
alternatives, for the basis of determining the
effects is always the zero alternative, i.e.
rejection of the investment. This, however,
hardly needs to be emphasized separately.)1
Depending on the situation, the alternative
considered may be, for example, regeneration
of a single stand, or a forest improvement
programme covering the whole forest unit
and consisting of a number of different steps.
However, it is essential that the investment
calculation — as understood in the present
study — does not contain the comparison and
elimination of several alternatives. Nor does it
state the acceptability or rejectability of the
alternative proposed. These two steps, ac-
cording to the interpretation adopted in the
frame of reference and definition of the study
problem, are parts of the decision making
process following after the investment calcu-
lation. They are to be carried out by the
decision maker himself rather than by the
consultant.
Restriction to one alternative in many cases
apparently corresponds to the decision making
situation. This is usually true when the forest
owner must decide whether or not he will take
part in a joint drainage project. The individual
participants in the project seldom have much
choice concerning the extent, timing or
method. Usually there is only one alternative
and the consultant must explain its effects to
the forest owner, in the form required for
decision making.
Also, when there are several possible forest
improvement alternatives to be considered
simultaneously, for example when the forest
owner chooses a method of regenerating a
stand, it is customary and obviously also
appropriate to prepare separate investment
calculations for each alternative. When the
forest owner is presented, for each alternative,
with information on its effects in comparable
form he can carry out the comparison himself
and choose the one he finds best.
Not until there are so many alternatives
that the consultant, in order to master the
situation, must somehow reduce the number
before he presents the decision maker with in-
formation, or when, instead of choosing one
alternative, an investment programme com-
posed of several alternatives must be com-
piled, it may be advisable to combine in the
same calculation, at least partly, the trans-
formation and condensation of information as
well as the comparison and elimination of
alternatives/In timber growing this situation
usually arises only in the composition of a
management plan for a forest unit.
The scope of the present study, however,
did not include the methods and calculations
to be used in this type of planning. They are no
longer real investment calculations but rather
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their applications. It seems, however, that
the rules drafted above for the treatment of
the time factor in investment calculations
must also be followed in the applications.
Hence the theory formulated in the present
study can serve as a frame of reference and
starting point for future studies of the signifi-
cance of the time factor in forestry planning.
What has been said above concerning the
comparison of investment alternatives in
timber growing holds good, mutatis mutandis,
also for comparisons of e.g. forestry and agri-
cultural investments, or agricultural and, say,
digging machine investments. The consultant
treats each alternative separately, and com-
parison is carried out on the basis of trans-
formed and condensed information.
It is not necessary to assume that the same
consultant would be at work all the time. It
might even be difficult to find a consultant
equally versed in the ways and means of
earning an income from forestry, agriculture,
and possibly other additional income. Infor-
mation can be expected to be comparable even
when provided by different consultants as
long as they have understood the decision
maker's goals and time horizon identically,
transformed the information according to the
same principles, and lost no relevant informa-
tion in the condensation. The necessary calcu-
lations for timber growing may be ordered
from a forestry consultant and those for the
clearing and drainage of arable land from an
agricultural consultant.
In addition to those discussed here, there
are still many more aspects and component
problems associated with the application of
this theory — the more numerous the details
included the more their number grows. Ques-
tions such as how to handle, in the calcu-
lations, state subventions and taxes paid or
how to analyse the forest owner's financing
and investment possibilities, are probably
more naturally discussed in connection with
application studies.
The theory evolved would also provide a
basis for deliberating many interesting forest
policy problems, such as financing the forest
improvements, forest taxation, and the pos-
sible development of the forms of forest
ownership. There is every reason to revert to
these subjects in future, separate studies.
5. CONCLUSIONS
It may be recalled that the study problem
as defined in Chapter 25, was how the time
factor, i.e. the time differences in the changes
of the series of receipts and outlays, should be
taken into account in the calculations by
which the consultant assisting the forest
owner transforms and condenses the informa-
tion he has obtained or formed on the expected
effects of investments in timber growing on
the forest unit, when his target is to put this
information into a form which the forest
owner can directly compare with his goals.
After all that has been said above, the
author gives the following answer:
1. For the forest owner, his time horizon
sets limits to the cash flows relevant to him.
The consultant, therefore, must adjust the
horizon of the investment calculation according
to the true time horizon of the forest owner he
is working for. Extending the time horizon to
infinity or to the end of a rotation, because the
consultant does not know the true range of
the forest owner's time horizon, may be a very
misleading solution. When the forest owner's
time horizon is at a relatively close range —
say, at 5—30 years which, according to
opinions advanced and information available,
would seem possible at least in some cases —
the principal revenue effects of investment in
timber growing may be totally irrelevant.
More empirical studies of the distances of
time horizon are, however, required.
2. When expected cash flow changes within
a relevant time horizon are transformed and
condensed into fewer parameters, it is necessary
to take into account the forest owner's true goals
and his realistic possibilities of financing the
cash flow changes and making the investment.
The forest owner's time preferences are mani-
fested in his goals for consumption changes,
which therefore must not be included in the
calculation in any other form. Since an eco-
nomic unit must always be able to settle its
expenses when they fall due and receipts are
not available until the moment they are
obtained, discounting and prolongation of out-
lays and receipts is realistic only if a corres-
ponding realistic financing or investment pro-
cedure can be indicated.
3. If the consultant is ignorant of the forest
owner's goals or his possibilities of financing
and investment, it may be advisable not to
transform and condense the expectations (in-
formation). When the purpose of an in-
vestment calculation was specified, half the
purpose was said to be the condensation of in-
formation into elements fewer than their
original number. Since cuttings are few, the
relevant time horizon often accommodates no
more cash flow changes than are permitted by
the forest owner's ability to deal with infor-
mation (cf. Chapter 241 above). This tolerance
limit, therefore, does not always make conden-
sation necessary. On the contrary, the price
paid for condensation in the form of lost in-
formation may be »high» compared with the
benefit obtained.
4. Condensation of a series of cash flow
changes to its discount or present value cor-
responds to the decision maker's goals only in
certain cases which can be precisely delinea-
ted. Should the consultant not know the
forest owner's goals, he is well-advised to
present both the series of cash flow changes as
it is, and its present value. If he shows only
the present value, the consultant may conceal
information essential for the decision making.
Applied to the needs of the contractual
research mentioned in the introduction, these
conclusions give rise to the following proposal
of how to carry out the calculations.
The results of the contractual research
should also be helpful to individual forest
owners in their decisions concerning forest
improvements. Since their goals, time horizons
and financial and investment facilities ap-
parently vary, all the factors mentioned must
be considered as variables when the effects of
forest improvement alternatives are calcu-
lated.
In other words, it is advisable to carry out the
calculations of the contractual research sepa-
rately, using several time horizons and several
interest rates. In addition, in view of the pos-
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sible goals for consumption change that the regards the form of the investment calculation
forest owner utilizing the results may have in or its most suitable application to general
mind, the series of cash flow changes to be investigations such as the contractual re-
expected should also be presented as they are, search. Experience and the new empirical
unprocessed. material accruing from this contractual res-
Empirical knowledge so far available hardly earch, will however help to test and improve
justifies any more conclusions, either as the theory here developed.
6. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
The purpose outlined for the study was to
establish how the time factor, i.e. the temporal
differences in the effects of alternative ac-
tions, should be taken into account in invest-
ment calculations concerned with timber
growing in the forest of an economic unit
owned and controlled by one physical person.
Since forestry, almost without exception, is
carried out parallel with other economic activi-
ties and not on its own, the premise that in-
vestment calculations associated with timber
growing, as well as those associated with other
economic activities, be derived from the same
model was considered justified. The first
thing, therefore, was to expand the time factor
theory of investment calculations for this kind
of economic unit so as to cover all investments,
including those in forestry. The investment
calculations of timber growing were to be
studied as a special application of this more
general theory.
Investment was defined as an integrated
series of outlays and receipts, with an outlay as
the chronologically first member. From the
point of view of the total cash flows in a forest
owner's economy, investment always means
the replacement of an expected total cash flow
by another.
A review of the theory of decision making
led to the construction of a model of decision
making, and this again to a detailed definition
of the purpose of an investment calculation.
The investment calculation was interpreted
as a calculation transforming and condensing
the information on the immediate effects of
the investment. It was decided to study it as a
calculation made by a consultant assisting the
forest owner. It was also found useful to define
the study problem more precisely and to con-
fine it within more narrow limits than was
originally intended.
The study problem in its ultimate form was
to investigate how the time factor should be
taken into account in the calculation with
which the consultant assisting the decision
maker transforms and condenses the informa-
tion, composed of the expected effects of the
investment, in order to put it into a form in
which the decision maker can directly com-
pare it with his goals. There were also some
cardinal problems to be discussed concerning
the application of the theory so evolved to
cases in which the investment objects consist
of various steps in timber growing in a forest
unit of the type described.
The concepts of system theory were utilized
to carry out the task outlined. The direct
effects of investment, i.e. the information to
be transformed and condensed, was defined as
changes in the relationships between the ob-
ject system of investment and the decision
maker's relevant environment. Accordingly,
the individual's goals were interpreted as
changes he seeks to carry out in his own state
and/or that of his environment, their elements,
systems and relationships. The precise content
of both these concepts — the effects and goals
— ultimately depends on the observing party.
In other words, it depends on how this party
perceives and defines the decision maker's
relevant environment, its components and its
boundaries.
The investment calculation must be opera-
tional. Hence it cannot possibly include all
information relevant to decision making. The
investment calculation, therefore, is a partial
calculation with a structure governed both by
the situation to which calculation is applied
and by the goal setting in each individual
case.
It was agreed that the series of changes to be
included in the investment calculation should
consist of the changes in the decision maker's
cash receipts and cash outlays, i.e. cash flow
changes. The effects of investment manifested
as forest owner's own labour and other inputs,
and the output he uses himself may be
measured in money if certain conditions are
met, i.e. they may be replaced with imaginary
cash flow components, but in the present
study this aspect was only mentioned in
passing. Other types of investment effects
were completely excluded from the trans-
forming and condensing calculation. They
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must be considered separately by the forest
owner when he makes his investment decision.
An analysis of the individual's possible goals
revealed that they may, in different cases, be
changes at least in consumption, assets and
liquidity, and changes in the certainty of ex-
pectations, individually, or differently group-
ed. A more detailed analysis gave the following
further results.
If the individual has consumption goals, the
investment calculation must contain a plan of
how to finance and use the cash flow changes.
The acceptability of the calculation depends
on whether the measures (borrowing, lending,
investment) proposed in the plan are realistic.
Before he can produce a relevant calculation
the consultant, therefore, must know the
decision maker's realistic possibilities of finan-
cing and using the cash flow changes. If the
consultant does not know them it may be
advisable not to transform and condense the
series of cash flow changes.
Interpretation of the goal for change in
assets may vary. It is also difficult to show a
completely acceptable method of transforming
and condensing a series of cash flow changes so
that the parameter obtained would indicate
the change in the value of assets. If this change
refers to an exchange value it is, in principle,
impossible to determine it on the basis of
the series of cash changes alone. Other ways
and means must be found. If the subjective
utilization value and its changes are con-
sidered, the discount rates used in the evalua-
tion of separate cash flow changes must be
selected according to the calculation situation.
They may be based on the decision maker's
possibilities of financing and investment or, in
addition to these, on his time preferences for
consumption.
Liquidity is understood to mean either that
receipts and outlays must be correctly timed,
or that assets must be convertible into cash
without delay. The former will be automati-
cally realized if the investment calculation is
made in the form of a plan of financing and
using the cash flow changes. In the same con-
nection, restrictions on borrowing which
liquidity may make necessary must be taken
into account. Convertibility of property into
cash, on the other hand, cannot be inferred
from the series of cash flow changes as such.
Where required, it must be shown by some
other method.
The uncertainty of cash flow changes alone
may be a detail relevant to the decision maker.
In investment calculations, however, the
effect of uncertainty is manifested in the posi-
tion of the time horizon. The time horizon is
the limit beyond which the expected cash flow
changes are of no relevance for the consump-
tion of the decision maker. Nor can the utiliza-
tion value (present value) of the assets be
determined on the basis of cash flow changes
beyond the horizon. Conceptually, the value
coinciding with the horizon is necessarily the
exchange value.
These conclusions compose the sought-for
theory of investment calculations in timber
growing. It was considered new, especially
from the point of view of the approach used.
A uniform theory was created by interpreting
the investment calculation, made by a con-
sultant, as a transformation and condensation
of information, to be continued only as far as
available information permits. The conclu-
sions contained in this theory are largely
compatible with the more or less sporadic ideas
advanced earlier. The traditional methods of
calculation in timber growing can be con-
sidered to cover special cases in the sphere of
the theory developed.
Certain central problems encountered when
the theory is applied to calculation situations
in practice were then discussed. Special atten-
tion was paid to investments in forest im-
provement.
Essential effects of forest improvement are
changes in the cutting programme of a stand
or forest unit. In principle, the consultant
should always find out the effects on the cut-
ting programme of the whole forest unit. For
operational reasons, however, it may be
necessary to limit the study only to the object
stand and its cutting programme.
The cutting programme is composed of
separate cuttings (cutting decisions). The free-
dom of choice, whether to cut or not, is re-
stricted to the part of the growing stock un-
bound at the moment. Growing stock may be
bound by the stipulations of the Private
Forests Act and marketing possibilities, but
also by the goals the forest owner usually sets
himself for the continuity of forestry on his
forest unit. Since these goals are subjective,
close participation by the forest owner is
necessary in determining and modifying the
cutting programme for the forest unit.
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Little empirical knowledge is available con-
cerning the goals of forest owners, and their
detailed analysis therefore presupposes future
studies. A problematic situation, however,
was found to arise not only when achievements
lag behind expectations, but also when they
exceed the level of aspirations. If the forest
owner's goals, all or a number of them, were
associated with factors other than cash flows,
it is improbable that he would ask anybody to
make an investment calculation.
While no empirical data are as yet available,
indirect indications of the Finnish forest own-
er's time horizon can be obtained from the
results of studies concerning change of farm
ownership. Since the average period of owner-
ship is around 30 years, it is quite probable
that the owners, at least if they have no
children, do not apply a longer time horizon.
For an investment calculation, however, the
consultant must know the relevant forest
owner's time horizon. If he does not, he can
nevertheless carry out the calculations on the
basis of several time horizons. Then it is up
to the decision maker to choose the calculation
which he finds in best agreement with his own
time horizon.
If the forest owner's time horizon is very
short, it is possible that no positive cash flow
change occurs within it. The role of effects
other than those manifested or measurable in
terms of money will then become decisive.
It was considered necessary to emphasize
particularly that what is said here is primarily
applicable to the Finnish forestry, with long
rotations. In more favourable climatic condi-
tions where the rotations are only 5—15 years,
the time factor may play a less important role.
While an investment calculation applies to
only one investment alternative at a time, the
comparison of several alternatives takes place
on the basis of information about each of
them, individually transformed and con-
densed. Only if the number of alternatives is
very high and if compilation of an investment
programme is intended, the transformation
and condensation of information, and com-
parison of alternatives, may be combined in
one calculation. In timber growing this is
usually the case only when management plan
for a forest unit is drafted.
The results of the study were finally as-
sembled to constitute an answer to the study
problem. The consultant must strive to carry
out the investment calculation using the true
time horizon of the forest owner he is assisting.
In the transformation and condensation of the
expected cash flow changes he must take into
account the forest owner's goals and realistic
financing and investment possibilities. If the
consultant does not know them, it may be
preferable not to transform and condense the
information at all. When the forest owner's
goals alone are unknown, it may be advisable
for the consultant to present the series of cash
flow changes as it is, unprocessed, and its
present value.
In conclusion, a recommendation was
developed for the calculation procedure to be
used in the so-called contractual research into
the profitability sequence of forest improve-
ments. It would seem advisable to carry out
the calculations using both varying interest
rates and varying time horizons. In addition,
it is justifiable also to present the expected
series of cash flow changes, such as they are,
among the results.
Future empirical studies will be needed for
a more advanced development of the theory,
and also to test the above conclusions. The
theory now drafted on the basis of the present
studies will form the necessary frame of
reference.
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SELOSTE:
AIKATEKIJÄ JA INVESTOINTILASKELMAT PUUNKASVATUKSESSA
TEOREETTISIA PERUSTEITA
Tämä tutkimus aloittaa laajemman metsänpa-
rannustöitä ja niiden edullisuusjärjestystä selvittele-
vän tutkimussarjan. Pyrkimyksenä tässä ensim-
mäisessä osatyössä on hahmottaa tarvittavaa teo-
reettista perustaa mainitun tutkimussarjan yksi-
tyistaloudellisille laskelmille.
Tutkimuksen tavoitteeksi asetetaan aluksi selvit-
tää, miten aikatekijä eli vaihtoehtoisista toimenpi-
teistä koituvien seurausten eriaikaisuus tulisi ottaa
huomioon puunkasvatusta koskevissa investointi-
laskelmissa, kun kysymyksessä on yhden fyysisen
henkilön omistamaan ja hallitsemaan talousyksik-
köön kuuluva metsälö.
Koska metsätaloutta lähes poikkeuksetta harjoi-
tetaan muiden taloudellisten toimintojen ohella eikä
yksinomaisena, katsotaan välttämättömäksi, että
niin hyvin puunkasvatukseen kuin muihin talou-
dellisiin toimintoihin liittyvät investointilaskelmat
johdetaan samasta ajatusmallista.
Investointi määritellään yhteenkuuluvaksi meno-
ja tulosarjaksi, jonka ajallisesti ensimmäinen jäsen
on meno. Metsänomistajan talouden kokonaismak-
suvirtojen kannalta investointi aina merkitsee yhden
odotettavan kokonaismaksuvirran vaihtamista toi-
seen.
Päätöksenteon teoriaan luotava katsaus (luku 21)
johtaa päätöksenteon mallin rakentamiseen ja tämä
puolestaan investointilaskelman tehtävän yksityis-
kohtaisempaan määrittelyyn. Investointilaskelma
tulkitaan investoinnin välittömiä seurauksia koske-
vaa informaatiota muokkaavaksi laskelmaksi. Sitä
päätetään tutkia metsänomistajaa avustavan neu-
vonantajan laatimana laskelmana. Vastaavasti kat-
sotaan aiheelliseksi täsmentää ja rajata tutkimus-
ongelma alkuperäistä ahtaammin.
Tutkimustehtäväksi muodostuu nyt (luvussa 25)
selvittää, miten aikatekijä olisi otettava huomioon
laskelmassa, jolla päätöksentekijää avustava kon-
sultti muokkaa investoinnin odotetuista seurauk-
sista koostuvaa informaatiota tavoitteenaan tuon-
informaation saattaminen sellaiseen muotoon, että
päätöksentekijä voisi välittömästi verrata sitä ta-
voitteisiinsa.
Tehtävän suorituksessa käytetään hyväksi sys-
teemiteorian käsitteistöä (luku 31). Investoinnin
välittömät seuraukset eli muokattava informaatio
määritellään muutoksiksi investoinnin kohdesystee-
min ja päätöksentekijän relevantin ympäristön vä-
lisissä relaatioissa. Vastaavasti yksilön tavoitteet
tulkitaan muutoksiksi, joita tämä pyrkii saamaan
aikaan omassa ja/tai ympäristönsä tilassa, niiden
alkioissa, systeemeissä ja relaatioissa. Kummankin
käsitteen — seurausten ja tavoitteiden — tarkka
sisältö riippuu tällöin viime kädessä tarkastelijasta.
Toisin sanoen siitä, kuinka tämä mieltää ja rajoittaa
päätöksentekijän relevantin ympäristön ja sen
osaset.
Investointilaskelman todetaan olevan sidottu ope-
rationaalisuuden vaatimuksiin, joten se ei voi sisäl-
tää läheskään kaikkea päätöksenteossa mahdolli-
sesti relevanttia informaatiota. Investointilaskelma
on siten osittaislaskelma, jonka rakenteen voidaan
sanoa määräytyvän sekä laskentatilanteen että kul-
loisenkin tavoitteenasettelun mukaan.
Investointilaskelmaan sisällytettävien meno- ja
tulosarjamuutosten katsotaan olevan päätöksente-
kijän kassaan- ja kassastamaksujen eli maksuvirran
muutoksia. Luontoissuoritteina ilmenevät investoin-
nin seuraukset (panosten ja tuotosten muutokset)
saatetaan tietyin edellytyksin mitata rahassa eli
korvata kuvitelluilla maksutapahtumilla, mutta täs-
sä tutkimuksessa ne sivuutetaan maininnalla. Muun-
laiset investoinnin seuraukset sen sijaan suljetaan
täysin muokkauslaskelman ulkopuolelle. Ne päätök-
sentekijän on otettava erikseen huomioon investoin-
tiratkaisussaan.
Yksilön mahdollisiin tavoitteisiin kohdistettu
tarkastelu (luvussa 34) johtaa päätelmään, että eri
tapauksissa tavoitteina saattavat olla ainakin kulu-
tuksen, omaisuuden ja likviditeetin muutokset sa-
moin kuin muutokset odotusten varmuudessa, kukin
erikseen tai useammat yhdessä. Yksityiskohtaisempi
erittely tuottaa edelleen seuraavat tulokset.
Mikäli yksilöllä on kulutustavoitteita, investoin-
tilaskelman tulee sisältää maksunmuutosten rahoi-
tus- ja käyttösuunnitelma. Laskelman hyväksyttä-
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vyydcn ratkaisee suunnitelmaan sisällytettyjen toi-
menpide-ehdotusten (lainanotot, lainanannot, sijoi-
tukset) realistisuus. Relevantin laskelman laatimi-
seksi on konsultin niinmuodoin tunnettava päätök-
sentekijän reaaliset mahdollisuudet maksunmuu-
tosten rahoittamiseen ja käyttöön. Ellei päätöksen-
tekijä tunne näitä, saattaa maksunmuutossarjan
jättäminen muokkaamatta olla tarkoituksenmukai-
nen ratkaisu.
Omaisuuden muutostavoitteen tulkinta saattaa
vaihdella. On myös vaikea osoittaa täysin objektii-
vista, so. henkilöstä riippumatonta menetelmää tu-
lonmuutossarjan muokkaamiseksi niin, että saatu
tunnusluku ilmaisisi omaisuuden arvonmuutoksen.
.Jos viimeksi mainitulla tarkoitetaan vaihtoarvon
muutosta, on sen määrittäminen pelkän maksun-
muutossarjan perusteella jo periaatteessa mahdo-
tonta. On turvauduttava muihin keinoihin. Mikäli
taas kysymyksen katsotaan olevan subjektiivisesta
käyttöarvosta ja sen muutoksesta, on erillisten rnak-
sunmuutosten arvostuksessa käytettävät diskont-
tausprosent.lt valittava laskentatilanteen mukaan.
Ne voivat perustua päätöksentekijän rahoitus- ja
sijoitusmahdollisuuksiin tai näiden lisäksi myös
hänen ajallisiin kulutuspreferensseihinsä.
Likviditeettivaalimus voidaan käsittää joko
siten, että tulojen ja kulutuksen on oltava oikein
tahdistettuja, tai siten, että omaisuuden on oltava
nopeasti rahaksi muutettavaa. Edellinen toteutuu
itsestään, mikäli investointilaskelma laaditaan mak-
sunmuutosten rahoitus- ja käyttösuunnitelmana.
Samassa yhteydessä voidaan ottaa huomioon myös
lainanotolle likviditeetin vuoksi mahdollisesti ase-
tettavat rajoitukset. Omaisuuden rahaksimuutetta-
vuutta ei sen sijaan voida johtaa maksunmuutos-
sarjasta sellaisenaan. Se on tarvittaessa osoitettava
muilla keinoilla.
Maksunmuutosten epävarmuus saattaa jo sinänsä
olla päätöksentekijälle relevantti tieto. Investointi-
laskelmassa epävarmuuden vaikutus näyttäytyy
kuitenkin ensisijaisesti aikahorisontin muodostumi-
sena. Tämä merkitsee rajaa, jonka takaisilla mak-
sunmuutosodotuksilla ei yleensä ole päätöksenteki-
jälle kulutuksen kannalta merkitystä. Myöskään ei
horisontin takaisten maksunmuutosten perusteella
voida määrittää omaisuuden käyttöarvoa (nykyar-
voa). Käsitteellisesti horisontin kohdalle sijoitettava
arvo on pakostakin vaihtoarvo.
Näistä päätelmistä koostuva teoria on esitetty
puunkasvatuksen investointilaskelmien teoria. Sen
voitaneen katsoa olevan uusi nimenomaan käytetyn
tarkastelutavan osalta. Tulkitsemalla konsultilla
teetettävä investointilaskelma informaation muok-
kaukseksi, jossa konsultin tulee edetä vain niin pit-
källe kuin kulloinkin käytettävissä olevien tietojen
perusteella on mahdollista, on aikaansaatu yhtenäi-
nen teoria. Tämän teorian sisältämät päätelmät ovat
paljolti yhdenmukaisia jo aiemminkin esitettyjen
mutta enemmän tai vähemmän irrallisten käsitysten
kanssa. Traditionaalisia nykyarvomenetelmiä voi-
daan tietyssä mielessä pitää kehitetyn teorian eri-
tyistapauksina.
Tämän jälkeen (luvussa 4) otetaan käsiteltäväksi
eräitä teoriaa käytännön laskentatilanteisiin sovel-
lettaessa esiintyviä keskeisiä ongelmia. Etualalla
ovat tällöin investoinnit metsänparannuksiin.
Metsänparannuksen keskeisiä seurauksia ovat
metsikön tai metsälön hakkuuohjelman muutokset.
Periaatteessa konsultin tulisi aina määrittää vaiku-
tukset koko metsälön hakkuuohjelmaan. Operatio-
naalisista syistä joudutaan kuitenkin turvautumaan
myös metsikkökohtaiseen tarkasteluun.
Hakkuuohjelma koostuu erillisistä hakkuista
(hakkuupäätöksistä). Niitä tehtäessä harkinnanvara
rajoittuu puuston kulloinkin sitomattomaan osaan.
Sidonnaisuutta saavat aikaan paitsi yksityismetsä-
lain määräykset ja markkinointimahdollisuudet
myös metsänomistajan yleensä itse asettamat met-
sälön metsätalouden kestävyystavoitteet. Viimeksi-
mainittujen ollessa subjektiivisia on metsälön hak-
kuuohjelmaa ja sen muutosta määritettäessä met-
sänomistajien kiinteä osallistuminen tarpeen.
Metsänomistajien tavoitteista on varsin vähän
empiiristä tietoa, joten niiden yksityiskohtaisempi
analyysi edellyttää jatkotutkimuksia. Ongelmati-
lanteen todetaan kuitenkin voivan syntyä paitsi
saavutusten jäädessä jälkeen odotuksista myös nii-
den ylittäessä tavoitetason. Mikäli taas metsän-
omistajan tavoitteet ovat joko kokonaan tai pää-
osiltaan multa kuin rahavirtoihin liittyviä, on epä-
todennäköistä, että hän pyytäisi laatimaan inves-
tointilaskelmaa.
Suomalaisen metsänomistajan aikahorisontista
voidaan nimenomaisten selvitysten vielä puuttuessa
saada välillisiä viitteitä maatilojen omistajavaih-
doksia koskevista tutkimustuloksista. Kun keski-
määräinen omistuskausi on noin 30 vuotta, on melko
todennäköistä, että ainakaan lapsettomat omistajat
eivät juuri käytä tätä pitempää aikahorisonttia, jos
sitäkään.
Investointilaskelmaa varten konsultin on kuiten-
kin tunnettava juuri kulloinkin kyseessä olevan
metsänomistajan aikahorisontti. Mikäli hänellä ei
ole sitä tiedossaan, hän voi silti laatia laskelmat
käyttäen useita eri aikahorisontteja. Päätöksente-
kijän tehtäväksi jää tällöin valita laskelmista se,
jonka katsoo vastaavan omaa aikahorisonttiaan.
Mikäli metsänomistajan aikahorisontti on hyvin
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lyhyt, on mahdollista, ettei sen sisään mahdu yh-
tään positiivista maksunmuutosta. Muiden kuin
rahassa ilmenevien tai mitattavien seurausten mer-
kitys muodostuu tällöin ratkaisevaksi.
Erikseen on syytä korostaa, että tässä esitetty
liittyy ensisijaisesti Suomen pitkien kiertoaikojen
metsätalouteen. Suotuisammissa ilmasto-oloissa,
missä kiertoajat jäävät 4 — 15 vuoteen, aikatekijän
merkitys saattaa olla vähäisempi.
Investointilaskelman koskiessa vain yhtä inves-
tointivaihtoehtoa kerrallaan tapahtuu useampien
vaihtoehtojen vertailu niistä kustakin muokatun in-
formaation perusteella. Vasta kun vaihtoehtojen
määrä on hyvin suuri tai kun tavoitteena on inves-
tointiohjelman koostaminen, tulee kysymykseen in-
formaation muokkauksen ja vaihtoehtojen vertailun
kytkeminen samaan laskelmaan. Puunkasvatuk-
sessa tämä liittyy yleensä vain metsälön taloussuun-
nitelman laatimiseen.
Tutkimuksen tulokset kootaan lopuksi (luvussa
5) tutkimusongelmaan annettavaksi vastaukseksi.
Konsultin tulee pyrkiä laatimaan investointilas-
kelma käyttäen kulloisenkin avustettavan metsän-
omistajan tosiasiallista aikahorisonttia. Maksun-
muutosodotusten muuntamisessa ja tiivistämisessä
harvempiin tunnuksiin hänen on otettava huomioon
metsänomistajan tavoitteet ja reaaliset rahoitus- ja
sijoitusmahdollisuudet. Ellei konsultti tunne näitä,
voi olla tarkoituksenmukaista jättää informaation
muokkaaminen kokonaan suorittamatta. Metsän-
omistajan tavoitteiden pelkästään ollessa tuntemat-
tomia konsultin saattaa olla tarkoituksenmukaisinta
esittää sekä maksunmuutossarja sellaisenaan että
sen nykyarvo.
Lopuksi kehitellään suositus metsänparannustöi-
den edullisuusjärjestystä selvittelevässä ns. sopi-
mustutkimuksessa käytettäväksi laskentamenette-
lyksi. Laskelmat näyttäisi olevan syytä laatia käyt-
täen paitsi vaihtelevia korkoprosentteja myös vaih-
televia aikahorisontteja. Tämän lisäksi on perustel-
tua esittää tuloksina myös odotettavat maksun-
muutossarjat sellaisinaan.
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KANNATTAJAJÄSENET — UNDERSTÖDANDE MEDLEMMAR
CENTRALSKOGSNÄMNDEN SKOGSKULTUR
SUOMEN PUUNJALOSTUSTEOLLISUUDEN KESKUSLIITTO
OSUUSKUNTA METSÄLIITTO
KESKUSOSUUSLIIKE HANKKIJA
SUNILA OSAKEYHTIÖ
OY WILH. SCHAUMAN AB
OY KAUKAS AB
RIKKIHAPPO OY
G. A. SERLACHIUS OY
TYPPI OY
KYMIN OSAKEYHTIÖ
SUOMALAISEN KIRJALLISUUDEN KIRJAPAINO
UUDENMAAN KIRJAPAINO OSAKEYHTIÖ
KESKUSMETSÄLAUTAKUNTA TAPIO
KOIVUKESKUS
A. AHLSTRÖM OSAKEYHTIÖ
TEOLLISUUDEN PAPERIPUUYHDISTYS R.Y.
OY TAMPELLA AB
JOUTSENO-PULP OSAKEYHTIÖ
TUKKIKESKUS
KEMI OY
MAATALOUSTUOTTAJAIN KESKUSLIITTO
VAKUUTUSOSAKEYHTIÖ POHJOLA
VEITSILUOTO OSAKEYHTIÖ
OSUUSPANKKIEN KESKUSPANKKI OY
SUOMEN SAHANOMISTAJAYHDISTYS
OY HACKMAN AB
YHTYNEET PAPERITEHTAAT OSAKEYHTIÖ
